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MINDING ACCIDENTS
Teneille R. Brown, JD*
INTRODUCTION: MINDREADING AND MORALITY
A few summers ago, I was playing in the yard with my kids. I noticed
my 3-year-old son decapitating the lilies we had planted, which were just
starting to bloom. I told him to stop. He immediately blurted out “it was an
accident!” I surveyed the scene. There were eight beheaded lilies in a row.
Eight. He looked down. I told him that we generally do not repeat the same
movement, accidentally, eight times. He seemed mystified that I could have
read his mind, and thought I had some superpower.1 But this sort of amateur
mindreading—where we look beyond the actual words spoken, and discern
someone’s true thoughts through their expressions, behavior, character and
any other cues—is an essential part of being human.2
Few species can do this.3 Humans learn by about age four that other
people do not necessarily know what we know, which allows us to conceal
our thoughts and attempt to interpret theirs.4 In psychology mindreading is
called “theory of mind,” (abbreviated as “ToM”).5 This amazing capacity
allows us to think about thinking—interpreting and predicting our own and

*
This is a draft and is still very much a work in progress.
See, Daniel Alcala-Lopez, et al., Building blocks of social cognition: Mirror, mentalize, share? 118
CORTEX 4, 4 (2019); Francesco Margoni and Luca Surian, Conceptual continuity in the development
of intent-based moral judgment, 194 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 1, 3 (2020).
2
Kang Lee, et al., Children's use of triadic eye gaze information for "mind reading." 34
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 525 (1998)
3
Albert Bandura, Toward a Psychology of Human Agency, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 164, 165 (2006) (referring to this meta-cognitive ability as the “most distinctly human core
property of agency.”)
4
Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe, Neural evidence for “intuitive
prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. 6 SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE 302, 310 (2011) Chris Frith and Uta Frith, The Neural Basis of Mentalizing, 50
NEURON 531, 531 (2006); see also Birgit Völlm, et al., Neuronal correlates of theory of mind and
empathy: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study in a nonverbal task, 29 NEUROIMAGE 90
(2006)
5
This is also referred to as “mentalizing” or “perspective- taking” or sometimes even just as
“empathy.” For our purposes, these terms can be used interchangeably. See, Matthias Schurz, et al,
Toward a hierarchical model of social cognition: A neuroimaging meta-analysis and integrative
review of empathy and theory of mind. 147 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 293, 294 (2021).
1
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others’ thoughts and emotions.6 Sometimes the process is deliberate, as we
work to understand the unspoken feelings of our friends. More often, ToM
occurs spontaneously, without our awareness.7
Most of us cannot not infer mental states8 when we hear how someone
has behaved,9 and yet we take this profound ability for granted because it is
ubiquitous and yet invisible. You have probably heard someone exclaim
while arguing, “but I’m not a mind-reader!” It is true, we cannot fully decode
the contents of other minds. However, we have some capacity, however
flawed. We are also exquisitely determined as a species to try. Ironically, we
may be better at inferring the mental states of others because we do it
reflexively and often.10 In contrast, we do not need to explain our actions to
ourselves, so we are less practiced at it.11 Because our own thoughts often
elude us, there is no way to reliably calculate error rates in mindreading. In
complex cases the accuracy of our inferences cannot easily be determined.
To demonstrate how ordinary mindreading is, let us imagine a
scenario where you have just walked by your colleague’s office. She is sitting
by her computer with her head in her hands. You ask how she is doing, and
she flatly answers, “I’m fine” while rubbing her eyes. She has been crying,
and subtly turns away from you. Most adults would be able to recognize the
gulf between her words and her emotions, and interpret the scene: she is sad.
But, if instead of turning away, she stares at us without changing the topic,
she might also want us to ask her again how she is doing because this time
she is ready to share. Mindreading requires picking up on subtle nuances in

6

See, Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 529–31 (1992).
See also Irmak Olcaysoy Okten, Erica Schneid and Gordon Moskowitz, On the Updating
of Spontaneous Impressions, 117 J. PERSONALITY OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2019); see also James Uleman,
and Gordon Moskowitz, Unintended Effects of Goals on Unintended Inferences, 66 J. OF PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 490 (1996); Dana Schneider, Virginia P. Slaughter, Paul E. Dux, Current evidence
for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults, 162 COGNITION 27, 27 (2017)
8
I use “mental states” throughout the article to refer to all psychological processes (thoughts,
emotions, knowledge, perceptions, memories) that are enabled by the brain, regardless of whether they
are conscious. I thus assume a materialist view of the mind.
9
Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Jean Decety, From the perception of action to the understanding
of intention, 2 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI. 561, 561 (2001);
10
Joshua Hirschfeld-Kroen, et al., When my wrongs are worse than yours: Behavioral and
neural asymmetries in first-person and third-person perspectives of accidental harms, 94 JOURNAL OF
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 104102 (2020).
11
Joshua Hirschfeld-Kroen, et al., When my wrongs are worse than yours: Behavioral and
neural asymmetries in first-person and third-person perspectives of accidental harms. 94 JOURNAL OF
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 104102 (2020).
7
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behavior. As long as we are around other people, we do this several times a
day.
Like many biological capacities, ToM exists on a spectrum. 12 Those
who take the colleague’s “I’m fine” response at face-value likely struggle in
social interactions because they fail to pick up on non-verbal cues. As a
group, women consistently outperform men, especially on the more
emotional aspects of mindreading.13 People with autism possess deficits in
inferring people’s thoughts, but seem to do well interpreting their feelings.14
Psychopaths, conversely, struggle to decipher the emotional states of others,
but can often interpret their thoughts just fine.15 Because it is so critical to
socializing, our mindreading aptitude predicts how successful we are in many
of our social roles—as friends, as partners, as parents, and as jurors. In most
healthy adults, mindreading is a useful tool that helps us navigate our social
spheres. However, it is also susceptible to bias.
1. We make lots of mistakes when mindreading
We are particularly bad at decoding mental states when people are
motivated to deceive us,16 or when they are perceived as different from us in
some meaningful way.17 This has led many to place their hopes in a more
objective form of mindreading, supported by neuroscience methodologies.
However, even with significant advances in brain-based memory detection,
it remains impossible to distinguish between those who are driven to conceal
their thoughts and those who merely misremember.18

12
Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of
imagined and remembered events, 203 Cognition 104325 (2020).
13
Andrew Martin, et al., Sex Mediates the Effects of High-Definition Transcranial Direct
Current Stimulation on “Mindreading”366 NEUROSCIENCE 84, 84 (2017).
14
Maria Andreou and Vasileia Skrimpa, Theory of Mind Deficits and Neurophysiological
Operations in Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Review, 10 BRAIN SCIENCES 393 (2020)
15
Simone Shamay-Tsoory, et al., The role of the orbitofrontal cortex in affective theory of
mind deficits in criminal offenders with psychopathic tendencies, 46 CORTEX 668 (2010)
16
Emily Murphy and Jesse Rissman, Evidence of Memory from Brain Data, J. LAW AND THE
BIOSCI. (2020) (suggesting that even in the future when technological or methodological hurdles can
be overcome, how we mistakenly encode memories in the brain will limit the accuracy of any decoding
process).
17
Jonathan Freeman, et al., The neural origins of superficial and individuated judgments
about ingroup and outgroup members, 31 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 150, 157 (2010).
18
Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging
As Evidence of A Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1119, 1122
(2010)
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In sum, mindreading is not an objective science.19 It occurs through a
kaleidoscope of personal memories, morality, and emotion.20 It is influenced
by our perception, and influences how we perceive.21 This makes it both
critical to social interactions and also prone to bias.
2. Even blaming for carelessness requires mindreading
In Western cultures like the United States, blaming people for causing
harm requires some form of mindreading,22 because the actor’s mental states
matter more than the harm that is caused.23 For our ancestors, just as for us,
being able to infer whether someone tripped or intentionally kicked us was
considered vital for determining whether they were trustworthy and would
make good allies, or untrustworthy and should be shunned.24

19
Kevin Uttich, & Tania Lombrozo, T. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A
rational explanation for the side-effect effect. 116 COGNITION 87–100 (2010)
20
Kevin Uttich, & Tania Lombrozo, T. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A
rational explanation for the side-effect effect. 116 COGNITION 87–100 (2010)
21
Christoph Teufel, Paul Fletcher, and Greg Davis, Seeing other minds: attributed mental
states influence perception, 14 TRENDS IN COGN. Sci 376, 376 (2010); Brendan Gaesser, Episodic
mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of imagined and remembered events, 203
Cognition 104325 (2020). Mental states, character and morality thus exist in a positive feedback loop,
where one informs the other. See Jennifer Ray et al., The Role of Morality in Social Cognition, in THE
NEURAL BASES OF MENTALIZING. (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (manuscript at 13).
22
Fiery Cushman, Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional
analyses in moral judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 353 (2008); Melanie Killen, et al., The Accidental
Transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind, 119 COGNITION 197, 210 (2011); Oliver Genschow,
Davide Rigioni and Marcel Brass, The Hand of God or the Hand of Maradona? Believing in free will
increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior, 70 CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 80, 81
(2019); Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of
imagined and remembered events, 203 Cognition 104325 (2020).
23
Rita Anne McNamara, et al., Weighing Outcome vs. Intent Across Societies: how cultural
models of mind shape moral reasoning, 182 COGNITIOn 95, 100 (2019); For a fascinating discussion of
how the relative weight we assign to mental states verses bad outcomes changes as we age, see
Francesco Margoni, Janet Geipel, Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Luca Surian, The influence of agents’
negligence in shaping younger and older adults’ moral judgment, 49 Cognitive Development 116-126
(2019); Recent racial justice work seeks to remove the intent-focus; dismantling racist structures in
society may be better achieved by focusing not on the in intent of the actors, but on the impact on
people of color.
24
Kelly Lynn Mulvye, Secil Gonultas, and Cameron Richardson, Who Is to Blame?
Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence, 44 Cognitive
Science e12833, at p. 4 (2020); Harriet Over and Richard Cook, Where do spontaneous first
impressions of faces come from?170 COGNITION 190, 190 (2018); See, Peter Mende-Siedlecki,
Changing our Minds: the Neural Bases of Dynamic Impression Updating, 24 CURR. OP. IN PSYCHOL.
72, 93 (2018); Melanie Killen, et al., The Accidental Transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind,
119 COGNITION 197, 211 (2011)
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There are four steps in the process of deciding whether to blame
someone. First, we must recognize that there was a harm.25 Then, we ask
whether the actor caused the harm.26 If this actor can be said to have caused
it, we then move on to the next step, where we inquire into his intentionality.
Here, we look to circumstantial evidence that points toward the act’s
consequences being desired by the actor. Intentional harm is the most
diagnostic of immorality, and is therefore the most condemned.27 However,
even if there is insufficient evidence of intentionality, an actor might still be
blamed if we think he could have prevented the harm by exercising greater
care.28
There is a big distinction between intentional and unintentional
harm—both morally and in terms of the neural correlates of each.29 My son
implicitly understood that unintended accidents are less blameworthy than
intentional harm, which was why he was quick to claim his guillotinegardening was an accident. However, once we have decided the outcome was
not intended, then we still need to decide whether the actor was careless. Only
if an actor injures someone through a truly unpredictable freak accident will
they escape condemnation.30 We will still blame people for carelessly causing
harm.

25
In the moral psychology literature, they skip this step as they assume it has occurred.
However, the blaming process might be subtly different depending on the type of harm, and some
harms might not be considered significant enough to trigger blame.
26
Mark Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556, 564
(2000)
27
See, Fiery Cushman, Deconstructing Intent to Reconstruct Morality, 6 Curr. Opinion in
Psychol. 97, 97 (2015); See also Sean Laurent, Narina Nunez, and Kimberly Schweitzer, The Influence
of Desire and Knowledge on Perception of Each Other and Related Mental States, and Different
Mechanisms for Blame, 60 J. OF EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 27 (2015)
28
Fiery Cushman, Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional
analyses in moral judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 353 (2008); Marine Buon, et al., A Non-Mentalistic
Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social Evaluations, 126 Cognition 149, 149 (2013); See, Francesco
Marconi and Luca Surian, Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects, xx
CURRENT PSYCHOL. (2021) at p. 7; see also Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the
Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 147
(2011)
29
Jorie Koster-Hale, Rebecca Saxe, James Dungan, Liane L. Young, Decoding moral
judgments, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 5648, 5648 (2013) Jordan
Theriault, et al., Theory of Mind Network Activity is Associated with Metaethical Judgment: an item
analysis, 143 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 107475, 1, 1 (2020).
30
Marine Buon, et al., A Non-Mentalistic Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social
Evaluations, 126 Cognition 149, 149 (2013).
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By about six years old, we begin to find acts impermissible,
blameworthy, and deserving of punishment if someone causes a bad outcome
through their lack of due care.31 Lack of due care means that should have
done something differently to have prevented it.32 This is true even if the actor
is described as well-intentioned,33 and reflects Fritz Heider’s influential
account of moral development.34 This is where foresight becomes critical to
moral judgment; we cannot prevent the things we do not foresee.35 If bad
outcomes are not foreseeable in psychology and in law, this will lead to our
dodging blame.
3. Jurors must engage in mindreading in every trial
Mindreading conjures up flamboyant images of crystal balls or
charlatans. But it is a deeply serious endeavor for the law, we just do not call
it by this name. Instead, we refer to it as credibility assessments, or imposing
liability, or awarding damages. But regardless of what it is called, decoding
what the parties are thinking is a critical part of every trial, even when mens
rea is not at issue. The primary role of factfinders in the United States is to
serve as highly-regulated mindreaders—to listen to the testimony and decide
whether the witnesses are telling the truth.36
Far from being the exclusive domain of criminal trials, mindreading
is a part of every case that assesses credibility, legal responsibility, and
blame. This includes civil negligence, where jurors must engage in

31
Thomas Schultz, Kevin Wright and Michael Schliefer, Assignment of Moral Responsibility
and Punishment, 57 CHILD DEVELOP. 177, 177 (1986); Francesco Margoni, & Luca Surian, Judging
accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects. xx Curr Psychol xx at p. 2 (2021).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-020-01334-7
32
See, Francesco Margoni, & Luca Surian, Judging accidental harm: Due care and
foreseeability of side effects. xx Curr Psychol xx at p. 2 (2021).
33
Gavin Nobes, Georgia Panagiotaki and Chris Pawson, The Influence of Negligence,
Intention, and Outcome on Children’s Moral Judgments, 104 J. OF EXP. CHILD PSYCHOL. 382, 393
(2009).
34
Gavin Nobes, Georgia Panagiotaki and Chris Pawson, The Influence of Negligence,
Intention, and Outcome on Children’s Moral Judgments, 104 J. OF EXP. CHILD PSYCHOL. 382, 384
(2009)
35
David A. Lagnado & Shelley Channon, Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of
intentionality
and
foreseeability,
108
COGNITION
754,
758
(2008)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009
36
George Fisher’s excellent article on the development of the jury’s role as lie detector could
be read to swap “lie detection” out with “mind-reader,” as deception detection is just one type of
mindreading. The article suggests that the jury’s lie-detection’ role developed to legitimize the process
of litigation. See, George Fisher, The Jury's Rise As Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 704 (1997).
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mindreading to assess the carelessness of the defendant’s actions. While
proving the absence of due care is like proving the absence of criminal intent,
it is perhaps even harder as the actus reus is often consistent both with
carelessness and a freak accident. Given this difficulty, the lack of any
explicit mental state requirement in civil negligence creates the puzzle that is
at the heart of this article.
The previous section introduced the idea of mindreading, and its
centrality to assessing blame. Going forward, this article will proceed in just
three more parts. In the next, second part, I deconstruct the legal concept of
foresight, which plays an outsized role in negligence. I explain how treatises
state unequivocally that negligence requires no mental state inferences, while
the “reasonable foreseeability” test for duty, breach, causation, and damages
requires jurors to read minds. Ironically, then, because mindreading does not
officially exist anywhere in the elements of negligence, it now unofficially
exists everywhere. The underdeveloped doctrine of legal foresight causes
many problems both for theory and practice, which I will explore. In the third
part of the article, I deconstruct the necessary psychological components of
foresight to infuse the legal concept with greater precision and construct
validity. Rigorous research into the psychology of foresight makes clear its
utility for assessing blame, so long as we recognize that assessing foresight
requires mindreading.37 In the fourth part of the article, I explore how
rudderless mindreading can do mischief, chiefly to defendants, as jurors
replace what the defendant could have possibly foreseen ex ante with what
they know to have occurred ex post. Recognizing this, I conclude that jurors
need to be given specific instructions on how they are to infer the mental state
of foresight, with judicial guidance on which mental states can be inferred
objectively and which must be proved to be subjectively present. Only then
can jurors possibly assess whether it was reasonable for the defendant to have
failed to have foreseen a bad outcome.
PART 2: DECONSTRUCTING LEGAL FORESIGHT

37
Interestingly, foreseeability assessments engage many of the same brain areas as
those required for ToM. See, Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene

construction of imagined and remembered events, 203 Cognition 104325 (2020)
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When it comes to deconstructing mental states, legal scholarship has
focused almost exclusively on the criminal mens rea of intent.38 Little
attention has been given to the less sexy mental state of negligence. This is
lamentable given how common accidents are, and how complicated the
mental state of negligence can be.39 Negligence is both a criminal law mens
rea category and its own civil, common law cause of action. This article
focuses on the civil notion of negligence.
The criminal law concept involves statutes with bright line rules of
prohibited conduct, and the accompanying mens rea of negligence (such as
an unreasonable or mistaken belief).40 By contrast, a civil negligence
plaintiff must prove four prima facie elements. These elements are duty,
breach, causation and an injury the law recognizes. Notice, the terms actus
reus and mens rea are nowhere to be found. Despite being a criminal mens
rea category, civil negligence contains no mental state element.
If there were something like an actus reus in negligence, it would
reside in the element of breach. The prohibited conduct is not specified as it
is in the criminal law. Instead, to prove breach, the plaintiff must simply
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was probably unreasonably risky or
careless.41
4. Civil negligence doctrine contains no mens rea element

38

Even psychology studies of moral blame have myopically focused on the criminal law,
with references to “the law” excluding any consideration of non-criminal contexts. For an example of
this, see Normal Finkel and Jennifer Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: commonsense rules of
culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW 65, 65 (1997).
39
Kenneth Simons provides the only account I can find that acknowledges the epistemic
inputs to inadvertence and mistakes, and refers to the two collectively as ‘cognitive negligence.’
However, he also generally downplays the role of cognition in negligence. See, Kenneth Simons,
Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 288 (2002)
40
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West, 2021) In practice, criminal negligence often required
conduct that is more than unreasonable, and seems to approach recklessness.
41
Kenneth Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 283, 291–94 (2002) (Though in many cases the criminal mens rea of negligence requires
something more than unreasonable conduct, and approaches wanton disregard for risks or
recklessness).
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The black letter law found in case law,42 treatises43 and law reviews44
is that breach is about acting, and only acting.45 As one scholar put it, breach
is a “failure to comply with a legally specified standard of conduct, pure and
simple. It has no mental element.”46 Even those who view tort law as a vehicle
for redressing private wrongs acknowledge that breach is “clearly
objective—the primary question is whether the ‘external’ conduct of the
defendant was reasonably careful, not whether he maintained an ‘internal’
attitude of concern or care.”47 It seems settled then that there is no required
mental state inference in negligence. However, it was not always this clear
cut.
Early American Tort scholars debated whether the element of breach
might contain a mens rea requirement, and whether breach “consisted of a
state of mind or a type of conduct.”48 Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that
breach should be assessed purely according to an objective standard of
conduct, with no accompanying mental states. This idea was embraced by
Henry W. Edgerton.49

42 “There is a view, a generally accepted view, which I would adopt, that negligence
is conduct —conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm. [U]nreasonably dangerous conduct is negligence, without any
requirement that it be accompanied by any particular state of mind, and no particular state of mind
needs to be proven by the plaintiff to recover on a cause of action for negligence. Lynn Strickland Sales
& Serv., Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142, 148 (Ala. 1987),(concurring
opinion, overruled by Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250 (Ala. 1998)
43 See Edward Kionka, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, (7th ed) West Publishing (2020) at p. 67
(“Always bear in mind that negligence is conduct.”) Rest. (Second) of Torts, Sections 430-431 (1965);
57 Am.Jur.2d 351, Negligence § 10 (1971) (“The wrong lies in the conduct of the person charged and
the liability imposed is an incident of his act or omission to act”).
44 “However, the mental theory is now regarded as untenable, as it is well-established that
liability depends on neither the possession nor the absence of a particular mental state.” See, James
Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence,
28 Melb. U. L. Rev. 343, 350 (2004).
45 Kenneth Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 283, 291–94 (2002)
46 See, Daniel More, The Boundaries of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 339, 360
(2003)
47
John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky, TORT LAW: responsibilities and
redress, (4th ed, Aspen Casebook Series, 2016) at p. 172
48
Mark F. Grady, The American Negligence Rule, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 545, 548–51 (2019);
James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for
Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 343, 350 (2004); see also Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation
Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 56 (1962)
49
Mark F. Grady, The American Negligence Rule, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 545, 549
(2019)(describing how Vaughan v. Menlove embraced an objective standard of mental states, while
claiming to be about conduct.)
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Edgerton acknowledged that assessments of breach could invite
analyses of mental states.50 For normative reasons, however, he did not think
jurors should engage in mindreading. He thought the accompanying mental
states would be too difficult to prove.51 Edgerton’s view of breach has
prevailed, and is reflected in the law on the books, if not the law in practice.
Treatises and judges admit that whether the conduct was reasonable
“may depend in part on what the actor actually knew,” and that “[t]o
nonlawyers, the term ‘negligence’ suggests the absence of carefulness as a
state of mind.”52 But at the same time, treatises also maintain that “legal
negligence is conduct”53 and does not require “any evidence or proof of a
defendant’s state of mind.”54 How can both of these ideas be true?
Technically speaking, the commentators are correct. Negligence
jurors are not instructed to infer mental states from the physical
circumstances, as they are in criminal cases. And unlike in the criminal law
where defendants will be acquitted if the state fails to prove the requisite mens
rea, civil defendants are not granted motions to dismiss based on the
plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a negligent mental state.
But there remains a paradox. Negligence contains no mental state
elements. And yet the primary test for duty, breach, and proximate cause is
whether the outcome was “reasonably foreseeable.” And as I will
demonstrate below, this test requires jurors to read the defendant’s mind. So
jurors are likely hearing some mixed messages, and are confused about the
extent to which they are either allowed or supposed to infer mental states.
The doctrine is clear: no mindreading. The case law is less clear: sometimes

50 Henry W. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; the Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 867 (1926)
51
Henry W. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; the Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 HARV. L. REV. 849, 867 (1926)
52
See Edward Kionka, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, (7th ed) West Publishing (2020) at p. 67; For
an early example of the doublespeak, where judges could describe the breach in terms of what the
defendant knew, but to still assume this was an analysis only of conduct, see Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 78
53
See Edward Kionka, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, (7th ed) West Publishing (2020) at p. 67
54
Timothy D. Lytton, Rules and Relationships: The Varieties of Wrongdoing in Tort Law,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 366 (1997); James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral
Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 343, 351 (2004).
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mindreading is helpful. And the reality is completely ignored: every
negligence case requires us to read the defendant’s mind.
a. Ignoring mental states is made possible by conceptualizing Torts as
amoral
The law of torts is often defined by what it is not—not contracts, not
criminal law, and not administrative law. It is the distinction with the criminal
law that likely drives the rejection of mens rea elements in negligence, as
scholars try to hold the line between the moralistic, retributive criminal law
and the more compensation and deterrence-oriented negligence. In
negligence, we are just “making the plaintiff whole,55” compensating injured
parties56, shifting the loss to responsible parties,57 or preventing future
injury.58 Even when judges acknowledge that negligence is rooted in wrongs
that must be redressed,59 they rarely speak of morality.60
If negligence is amoral, we do not need to ask explicitly if the
defendant did anything with a culpable mental state.61 After all, nobody is
going to jail for civil negligence, the burden of proof is much lower, and
defendants can be liable without any demonstration of personal fault.62
Liability can even be strict if a defendant is subjectively incapable of

55
“The purpose of the tort law is to make an injured party whole.” Hayes Sight & Sound,
Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 442 (Kansas 2006)
56
Penwest Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 667 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Flores
v. Barretto, 54 P.3d 441 (2002)
57
Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, No. MMXCV116006351, 2013 WL 6038410, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 28, 2013), aff'd, 317 Conn. 223, 116 A.3d 297 (2015)
58
Figueroa v. Quinones, 2016 WL 8467013, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2016)
59
Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 154 (Col. 2013); See, Goldberg By &
Through Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984).
60
“When it is said that one has been guilty of the negligence denounced by the law, a fault
in personal morality is not necessarily implied. The standard by which he is judged is not internal, but
external.” Garland v. Bos. & M.R.R., 76 N.H. 556, 86 A. 141, 142 (1913); see also Rasnick v. Krishna
Hosp., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2011); For a minority view as it relates to duty, see Davis v. S. Nassau
Communities Hosp., 26 N.Y.3d 563, 572, 46 N.E.3d 614, 618 (2015) (“Courts resolve legal duty
questions by resort to common concepts of morality, logic and consideration of the social consequences
of imposing the duty”)
61
See Edward Kionka, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, (7th ed) West Publishing (2020) at p. 67 (When
it comes to the conduct-focus of breach “legal fault and moral blame diverge.”
62
Richard Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories in Tort Law, 88 IND. L.J. 469,
486 (2013).
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conforming his actions to what is reasonable.63 The amoral view of
negligence has prevailed in many law schools, where recently academics
have focused on the economic aspects of rules and the cost of accidents.64
However, this was not always the case65, and this view is certainly not
universally held.66
While negligence is certainly less about moral blame and punishment
than the criminal law, and the jurors’ emotional response may be attenuated,
jurors are still deciding whether to blame defendants for causing harm. They
still need to decide whether to make them pay. Even watered-down
negligence liability requires a finding of condemnation and responsibility,
which will invite an analysis of blame.67 Jurors use the same brain and
psychological mechanisms to blame people when it leads to money damages
as when it leads to jail.68 And if you are a civil defendant, large compensatory
damages probably feel like punishment, even if they are not intended to be
punitive.
We put too much weight on the ability of ordinary people to check
their psychology at the door when they become jurors. If we want to continue
to rely on human beings to assess legal responsibility and blame, we need to
come to terms with how they perform this function. If mental states factor
into assessments of civil negligence—and descriptively, they do—they must

63
“If…a man is born hasty and awkward…no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed
for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang
from guilty neglect. His neighbors, accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their
standard.” See, Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW (1881) at p. 108.
64
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972);
James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for
Negligence, 28 Melb. U. L. Rev. 343, 352 (2004) (“[N]egligence, by reason of being conduct-based,
diverges from morality.”)
65
Liability “is founded upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to
conduct himself, or exercise his own rights, as not to injure another.” Syllabus Point 8, Blaine v.
Chesapeake & O.R.R. Co., 9 W.Va. 252 (1876).
66
See for example the thoughtful work of John Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, which use
“civil recourse theory” to interpret more consistent moral overtones in tort. John Goldberg & Benjamin
Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1565 (2006) (“[T]ort and its historical antecedents were (as tort still is) rife
with concepts that link it to notions of morality”) For a critique of civil recourse theory, see Richard A.
Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L.J. 469, 470 (2013)
67
Anita Bernstein, The Communities that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 ChicagoKent Law Review 735, 735 (2002).
68
Fiery Cushman, Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional
analyses in moral judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 353 (2008). See, See, Markus Kneer and Edouard
Machery, No Luck for Moral Luck, 182 COGNITION 331, 332 (2019).
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do their work indirectly, in the penumbras of the law. We may prefer, as
Edgerton did, to keep the messiness of mens rea out of the civil law, and to
focus only on conduct. But this normative preference is not strong enough to
overcome the psychological reality.
b. Ignoring mental states is made possible by substance dualism
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, legal doctrines
assume that we can isolate the physical actus reus from the mental mens rea,
and attend only to the former.69 This notion reflects the philosophy of Rene
Descartes,70 who proposed that the physical body and metaphysical mind
were distinct. This is called “substance dualism,” indicating that mental states
are not made from physical matter, but instead exist in a more spiritual or
psychic space that is not biological71. Dualism is discredited by psychology
and neuroscience, but it has found permanent residency in many legal
doctrines.72 In various legal doctrines, mental states are treated as less real or
trustworthy because they stem from the invisible, metaphysical mind.73
Because they are not real, they can be faked. This is likely a big part of the
rejection of mental state elements in negligence. We do not trust what we
cannot readily observe.
The law’s emphasis on the actus reus also stems from our cultural and
human desire to see humans as free agents. This is relevant to moral blame,
as some hold that only where our minds are distinct, non-physical, and
“unaffected by the laws of cause and effect can an action be fully attributed
to it.”74 Put simply, if we want to blame people for their acitons, and of course
the law takes this as a given, then we must assume that actors are free to do

69
Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and Evidence
Combined, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2577, 2579 (2007); Tracy Batemen, et al., Mens rea and actus reus
distinguished,35 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Principles and Offenses § 20 (West 2021)
70
Rene Descartes, Méditations métaphysiques Œuvres Philosophiques 2, 383–505 (1641).
71
Matthias Forstmann and Pascal Burgmer, A Free Will Needs a Free Mind: belief in
substance dualism and reductive physicalism differently predict belief in free will and determinism, 63
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 280, 281 (2018)
72
Albert Bandura, Toward a Psychology of Human Agency, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 164, 167 (2006); Patrick Haggard, Sense of agency in the human brain. 18 NAT REV
NEUROSCI 196–207 (2017) “The legal concept of mens rea also contrasts with neuroscientific views
that emphasize the automatic, unconscious precursors of actions that are experienced as voluntary.”
73
Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable, at p. x.
74
Matthias Forstmann and Pascal Burgmer, A Free Will Needs a Free Mind: belief in
substance dualism and reductive physicalism differently predict belief in free will and determinism, 63
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 280, 284 (2018)
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otherwise. Conversely, if we explain our mental states in terms of biological
brain states, it is harder to hold people responsible for the subconscious
output of these neurochemical squirts. Thus, dualist beliefs are correlated
with belief in humans as possessing unconstrained, free will.75
Whether it is attributed to dualism or a strong belief in free will, there
is an intuitive appeal to treating observable actions as distinct from, and
preferable to, invisible mental states. However, despite this, the actus reus
and the mens rea are not dichotomous—or even distinct.76 Thinking and
acting cannot be neatly divided, either in the actor or in the observer.
All actions are “biologically determined and stem from patterns of
neural activity in the brain.”77 Neural activity gives rise to mental states,
which steer all of our cognitive, emotional, and physical processes. Even
reaching to grab a mug of coffee is mediated “by a rich and complex chain of
neuronal processes” which includes action selection, planning, motor
execution and monitoring feedback.78 While mental states might be more
than the sum of our physiological parts, we cannot act without thinking about
acting, even if we lack conscious access to those thoughts.79 I will next
explain how recent advances in neuroscience reveal this to be true.
c. Brains enable mental states, which give rise to behavior
The mental processes underlying conduct have been thoroughly
investigated in primate and human models, revealing the brain architecture

75

David Wisniewski, Robert Deutschlander, and John-Dylan Haynes, Free Will Beliefs are
Better Predicted by Dualism than Determinism Beliefs Across Different Cultures, 14 PLOS ONE
e0221617, at p. 16 (2019).
76
Some might suggest that our ability to discuss mental states independently from actions
means that they can be disconnected. And indeed, mental states and actions do have some distinct
properties. However, just because we can isolate these concepts linguistically does not mean that the
human mind can isolate the actus reus from the mens rea in practice when acting or evaluating actors.
77
Kevin D'Ostilio and Gaëtan Garraux, Brain mechanisms underlying automatic and
unconscious
control
of
motor
action,
6
FRONT. HUM. NEUROSCI.
1,
1
(2012)| https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00265
78
Etienne Combrisson, et al., From intentions to actions: Neural oscillations encode motor
processes through phase, amplitude and phase-amplitude coupling, 147 NEUROIMAGE 473, 473 (2017).
79 See, Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 59 (Oregon, 1960); Patton v. City of Grafton,
116 W. Va. 311, 180 S.E. 267, 269 (1935)
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necessary for the mental states that cause action.80 Studies of patients with
brain lesions81 and motor disorders82 have exposed the specific motor deficits
that stem from damage to particular brain areas. For example, lesions to the
parietal cortex from stroke cause people to experience difficulty with
perception,83 which impairs action.84 Parkinson’s disease stems from
neurodegeneration of a part of the brain called the substantia nigra, which
directly impacts the motivation and ability to move smoothly.85 This is caused
by deficits in the neurotransmitter dopamine.86 In a different genetic disorder,
a proof-of-concept study showed that the delivery of viral vectors to the
midbrain led to significant improvement in one girl’s ability to walk, by
stimulating her to produce endogenous dopamine.87 This is further evidence
that movement is enabled by brain states, and particular neurotransmitters.
Other treatments for motor disorders rely on the causal physiological
connection between brain structure, mental states, and motor function.
Clinicians can now place external coils on the surface of someone’s scalp and
disrupt the electrical current of the motor cortex to directly alter their
movements.88 This is called transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and it
undermines the dualistic ideas that the mind is a metaphysical thing that
cannot be modulated through the material world.

80

Fei Hu, et al., Prefrontal Corticotectal Neurons Enhance Visual Processing through the
Superior Colliculus and Pulvinar Thalamus, 104 NEURON 1141, 1141 (2019); Daniel M Wolpert and
Michael S Landy, Motor control is decision-making, 22 Current Opinion in Neurobiology 996 (2012)
81
Fabrizio Doricchi, et al., White matter (dis)connections and gray matter (dys)functions in
visual neglect: gaining insights into the brain networks of spatial awareness, 44 CORTEX, 983, 983
(2008)
82
Kevin D'Ostilio and Gaëtan Garraux, Brain mechanisms underlying automatic and
unconscious control of motor action, 6 FRONT. HUM. NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2012)
83
Fabrizio Doricchi, et al., White matter (dis)connections and gray matter (dys)functions in
visual neglect: gaining insights into the brain networks of spatial awareness, 44 CORTEX, 983, 983
(2008)
84
Simon Kessner, et al., Somatosensory Deficits after Ischemic Stroke, 50 Stroke 1116, 1116
(2019)
85
See, Suman Sen, et al., Dynamic changes in cerebello-thalamo-cortical motor circuitry
during progression of Parkinson's disease, 166 NEUROSCIENCE 712, 712 (2010)
86
see also Pietro Mazzoni, et al., Why Don’t We Move Faster? Parkinson’s disease,
movement vigor, and implicit motivation, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 7105, 7106 (2007).
87
Toni Pearson, et al. Gene therapy for aromatic L-amino acid decarboxylase deficiency by
MR-guided direct delivery of AAV2-AADC to midbrain dopaminergic neurons. 12 Nat Commun 4251,
4251 (2021).
88
Amir-Homayoun Javadi, et al., Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation of the Motor
Cortex Biases Action Choice in a Perceptual Decision Task, 27 J. OF COG. NEUROSCI. 2174, 2174
(2015).
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The mapping of brain structure to targeted functions has also led to
the development of implantable devices, called “brain computer interfaces”
(“BCIs”). These devices can stimulate brain areas such as the cerebellum or
basal ganglia to dramatically improve movement in people with disorders.89
Remarkably, BCIs have even empowered people to control prosthetic limbs
with their minds.90 These extraordinary devices would not be possible if the
causal, physiological connections between mental states and conduct were
not incredibly tight. The efficacy of BCIs for movement disorders provides
compelling proof that the brain enables mental states, which enable
movement. Otherwise, how could a physical computer control a metaphysical
thing? In this way, BCIs significantly challenge the idea of substance
dualism.
d. Our actions are driven by brain processes that often unfold outside of our
consciousness and control
While BCIs establish the ability to control our actions with deliberate
thoughts, there is a great deal of mental activity that never pierces our
awareness. Much of our action is “largely driven by brain processes that
unfold
outside
of
our
consciousness.”91
Using
EEG
(electroencephalography), a researcher named Ben Libet demonstrated that
preparatory motor action, in the form of detectable brain waves, precedes our
awareness of our decision to act. More recent studies using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have predicted how subjects would act
seconds before they reported making the decision, based on patterns of
activity in the precuneus and the fronto-polar cortex.92 At a minimum, these
studies reveal that we are often only aware of the many hidden mental
processes that enable movement after the fact.93 This complicates the idea
that are fully responsible for our actions, as they might be selected

89

Zhen Ni, et al., Effects of deep brain stimulation on the primary motor cortex: Insights
from transcranial magnetic stimulation studies, 130 CLIN. NEUROPHYSIOL. 558, 558 (2018)
90
Tyson Aflalo, et al., Decoding motor imagery from the posterior parietal cortex of a
tetraplegic human, 348 SCIENCE 906, 907 (2015); see also Chad Bouton, et al., Restoring cortical
control of functional movement in a human with quadriplegia, 533 NATURE 247, 247 (2016). 5
91
Kevin D'Ostilio and Gaëtan Garraux, Brain mechanisms underlying automatic and
unconscious control of motor action, 6 FRONT. HUM. NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2012)
92
Kevin D'Ostilio and Gaëtan Garraux, Brain mechanisms underlying automatic and
unconscious control of motor action, 6 FRONT. HUM. NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2012)|
93
Joo-Hyun Song and Ken Nakayama, Hidden cognitive states revealed in choice reaching
tasks, 13 Trends in Cogn. Sci 360, 360-362 (2009) 9
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involuntarily and without our awareness.94 If this is the case, then we should
be explicit about how often the negligence standard imposes something more
like strict liability. Courts have already acknowledged that people with
mental illness or intellectual disabilities might be held to an unattainable
standard of conduct that is more like strict liability for them. However, I hope
to demonstrate that the objective standard for breach leads to imposing strict
liability on healthy, “normal” defendants who reasonably fail to attend to or
foresee a bad outcome.
5. Negligence can only be inadvertent, otherwise it resembles recklessness
Now would be a good time to explore what it means for behavior to
be too risky or unreasonable under the negligence standard. We learn from
the case of Heaven v. Pender, that a duty of care is imposed whenever
someone fails to use “ordinary care and skill in his own conduct” that “would
cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other.”95 Thus, duty
and breach are intertwined; we cannot say whether to impose a duty without
knowing what sort of compliance is required. The “reasonably prudent and
cautious person under the same or similar circumstances” is the touchstone.
Defendants are not required to exercise greater than ordinary care.”96 What
is reasonable is for the jury to decide.
Attorneys often attempt to prove breach by calling upon mental states
that are more culpable than mere negligence. As negligence is the lesserincluded mental state, reckless or grossly negligent conduct can demonstrate
breach. However, relying on reckless conduct to evidence negligence does
not help us determine what is uniquely negligent.

94
For example, someone who is so self-absorbed and lacks empathy or awareness of others,
such that she makes derogatory jokes without realizing it, might be found unreasonable, ,as she should
know better, or this could be the result of an involuntary condition, similar to autism.; I am not referring
to cases where the wrong can be traced back to a failure to pay attention to something that the actor
was put on notice before to attend to, or an “underlying objectionable evaluative attitude”
but rather true non-tracing cases where a risk was simply not perceived in the moment, through no
objective moral or legal “fault” of the actor. For an account of how these can nonetheless result in
culpability, see, Holly M. Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 115,
117–18 (2011)
95
Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
96
D.E. Buckner, Foreseeability as an element of negligence and proximate caus, 100
A.L.R.2d 942 (Originally published in 1965 (West 2021).
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We do not find much help in the case law. Even the canonical breach
case of Vaughan v. Menlove arguably uses a recklessness mental state to
explain how Menlove was objectively unreasonable.97 In Vaughan, the
defendant famously said he would “chance it” by keeping his barrels of hay
near his neighbors’ cottages, despite multiple warnings that they could ignite.
His conscious disregard for a substantial, life-threatening risk likely meets
the epistemological state of recklessness.98 Judges have acknowledged that
the move from mere negligence to gross negligence hinges on the mental
states of the defendant, and yet negligence itself requires no mental state
inferences.99 These distinction between recklessness, gross negligence and
mere negligence matter, as punitive damages are not typically available for
mere negligence.100 What’s more, it does not help us isolate carelessness from
recklessness.
Legal theorists like H.L.A. Hart argued that negligence ought to be
conceived of as the failure to exercise a capacity for greater care.101 To him,
this explained why children under 7 years old could not be held liable for the
breaches they commit, because they ostensibly lack the capacity to take
reasonable care.102 On this view, it does not make sense to hold people
accountable for negligence who could not have acted otherwise to prevent a
bad outcome. They must have had some capacity for greater care that they
failed to exercise, otherwise, we are holding actors liable for accidents that
were unpreventable in this instance, which is not fair. There are other views
on how the negligence standard ought to be operationalized, but it is Hart’s
notion of negligence that I adopt here.

97
Mark F. Grady, The American Negligence Rule, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 545, 550 (2019)
(describing how Vaughan adopted an “objective conception of negligence, but it was an objective
definition of a negligent state of mind” and how this evolved into an objective standard for conduct, as
evidenced by the later case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks).
98
See, Mark F. Grady, The American Negligence Rule, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 545, 548–51
(2019; See, John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky, TORT LAW: responsibilities and
redress, (4th ed, Aspen Casebook Series, 2016) at p. 173
99
“[G]ross negligence can never be the result of “momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence,
or error of judgment.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 325–26 (Tex. 1993);
D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tex. App. 1997), rev'd, 973 S.W.2d 662
(Tex. 1998)
100
Martin v. I-Flow, LLC, 2015 WL 13662810, at *2 (D.N.M. July 2, 2015).
101
Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and
the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 147, 151 (2011)
102
Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and
the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 147, 151 (2011)
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Of course, if we are aware of our specific incapacities, they can trigger
obligations to attend to future risks.103 The actions we may be expected to
take to generate the knowledge or awareness that could prevent accidents
have been referred to as “procedural epistemic obligations.”104 Thus our
capacity might shift from being reasonably careful when skiing to being
careful to only ski near beginners, or to wear a “beginner” vest. Even so, these
precautions only become possible because we are aware, or should be aware,
of a risk. But if we reasonably and completely fail to appreciate a risk, even
if we are cognitively quite normal, it will be impossible to plan ahead to avoid
it.105
This gets to a critique of the law and economics concept of
negligence, which emphasizes ex ante incentives and efficiency.106
Embedded within this philosophy is an assumption that negligence involves
some sort of deliberate, yet ultimately incorrect, weighing of the costs and
benefits of precaution.107 Breach is defined in terms of mental states, but
rational and conscious mental states that are sensitive to external
incentives.108 If a driver tries to, but fails to hit the brakes quickly enough,
this is often due to implicit mechanisms that are impervious to deterrence
goals. If instead the driver weighed the possibility of an accident but
consciously thought he was willing to risk it because he did not want to be
late for a critical business meeting, then this is more akin to recklessness than
negligence.
Holding entities liable for their failure to invest in justified precaution
makes sense when applied to sophisticated and deliberate corporate
decisions, such as weighing the risk-utility tradeoffs in the design of new

103

See, Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable? Introduction to
Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 97, 106 (2011); See Daniel
Miller, Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance, 174 Philos. Stud. 156, 1580 (2017)
104
See Daniel Miller, Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance, 174 PHILOS.
STUD. 156, 1568 (2017)
105
Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and
the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 147, 181–82 (2011)
106
Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32 (1972)
107
“[T]he Hand formula itself seems to presuppose advertent risk-taking.” See, Gary T.
Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 727 (1978)
and see also Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of
Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 306 (2013)
108
Timothy D. Lytton, Rules and Relationships: The Varieties of Wrongdoing in Tort Law,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 365–66 (1997)
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products.109 It makes much less sense when applied to fallible human beings,
making quick decisions to act (or not). The normative goals of law and
economic-styled deterrence cannot be achieved when the breach is an
inadvertent failure to perceive or attend risk, which might have been
reasonable at the time. Even if the breach is a failure to appropriately weigh
the risks and benefits of a particular action, this mental process often occurs
implicitly and without our awareness. Liability cannot deter this type of risky
conduct, as deterrence presumes an ability to internalize and correct risk. Of
course, liability could be justified under a different theory of liability that
emphasizes the harm done rather than rational ex ante cost-benefit analysis.
6. A negligent mental state is necessary for negligence liability, while acting
is not necessary
The argument for breach is almost never limited to how the defendant
acted. Where negligence liability is not derivative, such as with vicarious
liability, the breach of the primary actor always includes within it a claim that
the defendant failed to perceive, attend, realize, know, or carefully weigh the
risk of a bad outcome.110 In some cases this failure might be reasonable, and
in other cases it might not.
While an unreasonable actus reus is not a requirement (such as in
cases of negligent informed consent, or failure to warn) possessing a
negligent mens rea is necessary for negligence liability. This is true whether
the case involves dispensing the wrong medication111, stacking hay in a way
that would likely ignite112, failing to warn a paramour about a sexuallytransmitted disease113, not buying a radio for a tugboat114, failing to give a
pressure test for glaucoma115, not cleaning up a spill that leads to a fall116,

109

Given how many ways a decision to act can go awry, based on cognitive processes that
are outside of our control, individual actor negligence is more like manufacturing defect than first meets
the eye.
110
Contreras v. Roadrunner Distribution, Inc., No. CIV. 98-991 SC/RLP, 1999 WL
35808346, at *1 (D.N.M. Nov. 29, 1999)
See, Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 884 (2004) This is even true in cases of design defect and failure to warn
“strict” product liability.
111
Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961 (Me. 2000)
112
Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
113
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989).
114
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
115
Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
116
Medders v. Kroger Co., 257 Ga. App. 876, 877, 572 S.E.2d 386, 387 (2002)
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failing to keep a proper lookout when driving a tractor-trailer,117 or not
securing informed consent for medical treatment.118 Each of these cases
involve conduct (more precisely, lack of conduct) that was unreasonable in
light of what the defendant knew or should have known, or a risk that he
perceived or should have perceived. We cannot say whether these actions
were negligent without assessing what the defendant could have (and thus
should have) already known.
In the case of the pharmacist who dispensed the wrong medication,
this is careless not because of his physical act of filling the pill container, but
because he mistook the name or dosing information for the prescribed pills.
If he had intentionally filled the wrong medication and it killed the patient, it
could be murder. If he had filled the right pills, there would be no negligence.
His actions and specific motor movements were not at issue—the breach was
his failure to attend to the name or quantity of the prescribed drug.
This is true for any negligence case—analyzing breach requires
analyzing mental states. Failing to buy a functioning radio for your tugboat
is not an actus reus, it is a miscalculation of the costs and benefits of taking
a reasonable precaution of which you should have been aware. Failing to mop
up a spill in a grocery store is not careless if it’s after hours and you know no
one will traverse the area before it is cleaned in the morning. Whether any act
is careless depends on the defendant’s subjective knowledge at the time.
Even in cases that seem mostly about conduct itself, such as a claim
that a contractor failed to use adequate skill when building a home, the
unreasonableness of the act involves a mens rea element such as
miscalculating distances, failing to accurately predict outcomes, or making a
mistaken risk assessment in the choice of materials or installation methods.
Even clumsiness involves cognitive miscalculations in perception. While
breach need not involve action, it does require a negligent mental state.119
The claim that analyzing breach requires analyzing mental states
contradicts doctrinal orthodoxy, despite being fairly evident to judges and

1999)

117

Contreras v. Roadrunner Distribution, Inc., 1999 WL 35808346, at *1 (D.N.M. Nov. 29,

118

Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988)
See Edward Kionka, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, (7th ed) West Publishing (2020) at p. 125

119
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litigants. Judges acknowledge that even something simple like being careful
to look for oncoming trains contains within it a mens rea element:
“[i]t cannot be understood that the plaintiff's act of looking
was a mere involuntary or instinctive physical motion
devoid of intelligence. If it were so, then the act was no
evidence of care. The ordinary person who is habitually
careful in looking for passing trains at crossings does
something more than turn his head. He also thinks whether
a train is approaching. The act of looking is a physical
motion plus a mental process.120
If the formal doctrine of negligence excludes a mental state
requirement, factfinders will find a way to let it in—through a backdoor if
necessary. This is precisely what the common law of negligence has done,
through its adoption and interpretation of the test of “reasonable
foreseeability” for duty, breach, and proximate causation. However, rather
than being transparent about the need to evaluate mental states when
assessing foreseeability, even this test cloaks mental states in a false veneer
of objective conduct.121
PART 2: DECONSTRUCTING LEGAL FORESIGHT
1. How breach becomes foresight
To assess objective reasonableness, judges instruct jurors that they
must determine whether the defendant’s conduct deviated from what a
reasonably careful person would have done in the same situation. When there
are established standards of care, foreseeable harms from non-compliance are
presumed; these risks likely precipitated the development of the standard.
However, in many cases the precise behavior is novel and there is no
established standard of conduct. In this case, the jury should ask whether the
defendant reasonably should have foreseen the general type of harm that
resulted from his actions.122 If a reasonable person would have foreseen the

120

Bursiel v. Bos. & M.R.R., 134 A. 40, 43 (1920)
See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 78.
122
Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden and Ellen M. Bublick, § 123 Negligence: after the fault
principle, THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed.) (West 2021)
121
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type of harm that occurred, then this defendant should have too. This is how
reasonable foreseeability becomes relevant to negligence and breach.123
As a test, foreseeability does the lion’s share of work in negligence.124
In most jurisdictions, whether the outcome was “reasonably foreseeable” has
become the primary test for duty, breach, and proximate causation.125
Foreseeability even plays a role in determining whether a class of injury (such
as pure economic damages or emotional harm) should be compensable.126
The focus of this article is the test of foreseeability for breach, but similar
analyses apply to the use of foresight in duty and proximate cause.
Foresight is its own separate mental state that is required for proving
all other mens rea categories. We cannot intend, know or be near certain of a
risky outcome that we do not at a minimum foresee. While foresight is built
into proving intent, recklessness, and knowledge, in negligence it
independently carries the weight for assigning blame.
2. The different tests of foreseeability overlap, blurring the role of judge and
jury
Foreseeability plays an outsized role in proving the elements of
negligence. Some of these elements are for the factfinder (breach, causation
and damages) while only the judge can decide whether to impose a duty.127
This division of labor reflects the idea that foreseeability for breach and
causation should be analyzed with reference to the specific facts of the

123

While some studies treat negligence as a separate construct from foreseeability, there are
often statistically significant interactions between “due care” and “foreseeability,” which indicates that
information about carelessness is tightly linked with information about foreseeability and
preventability when judging actions. See, Francesco Marconi and Luca Surian, Judging accidental
harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects, xx Current Psychol. (2021)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-020-01334-7 at p. 6
124
See Joshua Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in
Experimental Jurisprudence, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 235 (2021)
125
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2009)
126
Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 588 (WVa. 2000)
127
Courts and scholars have suggested that the foreseeability test for duty is meant to be more
abstract, and not rely too much on the specific facts of a case. And yet—we cannot say in the pure
abstract whether something is foreseeable.
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case.128 When “reasonable minds can differ as to whether the conduct lacks
reasonable care,” the jury should make this determination.129 Foreseeability
for duty, on the other hand, is meant to be more abstract and based on policy
factors.130
The different tests for foreseeability should not overlap, because the
plaintiff needs to demonstrate duty, breach, causation and injury to survive a
motion for summary judgment.131 And yet, in practice, they do.132 This is
because foreseeability cannot be decided completely in a factual vacuum.
And once the judge entertains some facts, it is hard for the judge to know how
far to go in tailoring the inquiry to the specific facts. This has led to
controversy, as judges decide cases on “no duty” grounds, which could, or
should, be handled under breach or causation.133 This is just one of the many
ways that the foreseeability analysis vexes judges and legal scholars.
3. The legal concept of foreseeability lacks construct validity
Courts sometimes engage in thin legal reasoning when trying to
explain whether a harm was foreseeable. On appeal, judges often simply ask
the question “should this have been foreseen?” and then recite the facts of the
case with a conclusion that the injury was therefore foreseeable, or was not.134
For a representative example, consider the following.

128

“The terminology [foreseeability] is confusing, as the term has different connotations as
to each of the different tort elements to which it is applied. An essential difference among the elements
is that duty is a question of law determined on a categorical basis, while breach and proximate cause
are questions for the fact finder determined on a case-specific basis.” See, B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West,
275 P.3d 228, 235 (Utah, 2012)
129
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 8 (2010)
130
Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield, 140 N.E.3d 837, 839–40 (Ind.
2020); Moore v. W. Carolina Treatment Ctr., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 3d 825, 831 (E.D. Tenn. 2016);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1247, 1248 (2009)
131
In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1309–10 (D.
Minn. 2014)
132
Rory Bahadur, Almost A Century and Three Restatements After Green It's Time to Admit
and Remedy the Nonsense of Negligence, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 61, 69 (2011); see also John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1742 (1998)
133
“[W]hy do courts in social host cases decide foreseeability under the guise of duty when
what they are really doing is deciding breach or proximate cause as a matter of law?” W. Jonathan
Cardi, Purging Foreseeability the New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 764–65 (2005)
134
Sloan on behalf of Est. of Sloan v. Providence Health Sys.-Oregon, 364 Or. 635, 646, 437
P.3d 1097, 1104 (2019)
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A patron at a rock concert was injured when another guest threw a
beer bottle at him. He sued the venue for negligence. The trial judge did a
better-than-average job explaining the facts—i.e., there was insufficient
security and reserved seating, patrons were openly drinking from liquor
bottles, and some were unruly.135 But apparently we are to glean from these
facts alone, that it was obviously “reasonably foreseeable” that a guest would
be hit with a beer bottle, or physically injured in some way.136 There is no
explanation for why these facts tilt toward a probable injury like the one that
occurred.
Imagine you were a juror in this case. Your analysis of foreseeability
will depend on our own perspective, memories, knowledge, and your
experiences with concerts and unruly crowds. Perhaps you think it was likely
that someone would be injured, because you personally hate drunken crowds,
and avoid them because you worry about getting hurt. But it’s equally likely
you find this outcome to be improbable ex ante, as perhaps you have attended
many rowdy concerts and always went home unscathed.
While jurors might be instructed not to consider what they would have
personally done had they been the defendant, this is often exactly what they
do.137 Objective foreseeability cannot be assessed without jurors putting
themselves in the shoes of the defendant and reflecting on the defendant’s
mental states at the time. Assessing foreseeability requires a form of “mental
time travel,” where events in the future or past are imagined by referencing
how scenes are constructed for us, as well other episodes in our lives.138
The defendant’s calculation of foreseeability involves his perception,
memory, and knowledge.139 The jurors’ analysis of whether that calculation
was reasonable requires all of things through the derivative third-person lens

135

Greenville Mem'l Auditorium v. Martin, 301 S.C. 242, 245, 391 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1990)
Greenville Mem'l Auditorium v. Martin, 301 S.C. 242, 245, 391 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1990)
137
Instructions not to consider what the jurors themselves would have done are referred to
as “no golden rule” rules.
138
Suddendorf, T. & Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What is mental time
travel and is it unique to humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 299–313
139
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 44 (2017).
136
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of mindreading.140 This shift from the first-person assessment of foresight to
the third-person assessment can generate a whole host of biases that have yet
to be explored in negligence doctrine.141 I will address two such biases infra
at [x].
Rather than defending its validity as a construct, scholars
acknowledge that foreseeability is “murky,”142 the “dark matter of tort” and
no better defined than “strawberry shortcake.”143 These squishy definition
indicates the concept lacks construct validity. And if that is the case, it will
be used as a surrogate for judicial or juror discretion,144 which leads “students
and scholars to think that negligence law lacks conceptual integrity.”145
Judges, too, have questioned the outsized reliance on foreseeability, given
that it “is such a ‘malleable standard’ that has been muddled and
misconstrued to the extent that it has lost any force as a discernable legal
test.”146 But it does not have to be this way.
As I will elucidate, foreseeability lacks validity because we have
failed to recognize it as an epistemic state, that requires inspecting what the
defendant knew, perceived, imagined, or remembered. Foreseeability is only
a vexing morass147 and malleable standard because we have ignored its
necessary mental components, and thus define it in circular, substantively
bankrupt ways.

140
Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of
imagined
and
remembered
events,
203
Cognition
104325
(2020).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104325.
141
Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of
imagined and remembered events, 203 Cognition 104325, at p. 17 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104325.
142
Benjamin Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2009)
143
Russ VerSteeg, Perspectives on Foreseeability in the Law of Contracts and Torts: The
Relationship Between "Intervening Causes" and "Impossibility", 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1497, 1498
(2011)
144
W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability the New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 743 (2005)
145
Benjamin Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2009)
146
Wilson v. Moore Freightservice, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00771, 2015 WL 1345261, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015))
147
W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power
in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 740 (2005);
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4. How are jurors currently instructed on foreseeability?
Courts sometimes rely on actual or subjective foreseeability to inform
reasonable foreseeability, but the official test is whether a reasonable person
should have foreseen the likely harm.148 Foreseeability is “a common-sense
perception of the risks involved in certain situations” and “whatever is likely
enough to happen that a reasonably prudent person would take it into
account.”149 If a reasonable person would perceive this risk as likely and try
to avert it, it would be careless for the defendant not to as well.
a. Foreseeability is prospective
Foreseeability embodies “a prospective judgment” about what the
defendant should have realized before the accident materialized.150 It should
not be assessed with reference to what occurred, but from the perspective of
right before the breach. Notably, it does not require perfect prediction of the
exact consequences. Rather, the defendant need only to foresee the general
type of harm that a reasonable person would find likely to occur.151
Defendants should only be liable for outcomes that are probable, as opposed
to merely possible.152
b. There is no objective test of what should be foreseen
Alas, there is no magic test for specifying what exactly needs to be
foreseen.153 Jurors are merely told that the defendant need not foresee the

148
The concept of “reasonable foreseeability” is fraught. It is impossible to operationalize
and is likely confusing many jurors, see infra at [x].
149
Canaday v. Midway Denton U.S.D. No. 433, 42 Kan. App. 2d 866, 876, 218 P.3d 446,
454 (2009)
150
Winkler v. Win Win Aviation, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 3d 772, 779 (S.D. Ohio 2018), aff'd, 769
F. App'x 337 (6th Cir. 2019); Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or. 58, 69–70, 377 P.3d 492, 499 (2016); Hodges
v. Putzel Elec. Contractors, 580 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2003); Stiens v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., No. 2018-CA1762-MR, 2020 WL 7266398, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2020)
151
By Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About
Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 165 (1995)
152
Hodges v. Putzel Elec. Contractors, 580 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2003); Baum-Holland v. Hilton
El Con Mgmt., LLC, 964 F.3d 77, 89 (1st Cir. 2020); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 895 P.2d 561, 563
(1995)
153
This problem is present in the analysis of duty, but even more acute with breach, because
factfinders are supposed to rely on the facts of this particular case
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precise injury that occurred, just the general type,154 as foreseeability speaks
“not as to the particulars but the genus.”155 But even a general description of
the injury permits wiggle room, as there is not a bright line between types and
tokens.
This “level of abstraction” problem presents an opportunity for
strategic framing. The plaintiff seeks to frame the harm broadly, and the
defendant seeks to define it as narrowly as possible. Should the employer
have foreseen that the lack of a splashguard (for employees working with
molten metal) would likely cause a burn that would lead to lip cancer and
ultimately death?156 Probably not. Should the employer have foreseen that
some physical harm would likely result from not having a splashguard?
That’s a much easier call. The more narrowly the injury is described, or the
more it is represented as a token, the less foreseeable that specific outcome
is.
How the general type of injury is described makes a big difference in
the case. If a defendant reasonably foresees the general type of injury but it
turns out to be much greater in magnitude, she can be liable for the
unexpected, full amount.157 But if the type of injury is not foreseeable, the
defendant will pay nothing. Parties often go back and forth arguing how the
injury ought to be defined.
c. How is foreseeability proved?
Assuming arguendo we could agree on what exactly should be
foreseen, how do attorneys prove that this harm was or was not reasonably

154
Stiens v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., No. 2018-CA-1762-MR, 2020 WL 7266398, at *7 (Ky. Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 2020); See also, L. Currie Corp. v. E. Coast Sand & Gravel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 524, 528
(Mass, 2018)
155
Jolley v. Sutton London Borough Council, 2 Lloyds Rep. 65 (H.L. 2000) (“The
foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus…[the question for this appeal] is whether the
judge was right in saying in general terms that the risk was that children would ‘meddle with the boat
at the risk of some physical injury’ or whether the Court of Appeal were right in saying that the only
foreseeable risk was of “children who were drawn to the boat climbing upon it and being injured by
the rotten planking giving way beneath them.” See also, Ortega Garcia v. United States, 986 F.3d 513,
526 (5th Cir. 2021)”
156
Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., 2 Q.B. 405 (1962) (Stating that the defendant cannot be liable
for “unforeseeable damage of a different kind from that which was foreseen, but [can be liable for]
more extensive damage of the same kind.”)
157
For a discussion of the luck involved in this doctrine, see Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral
Luck, and Blame, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 57, 64 (2012)
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foreseeable? That is, how do jurors infer or see breach and foreseeability? In
many cases, quite simply, they do not.
Distinguishing pure accidents from carelessness is much harder than
distinguishing intentional from unintentional harm. As Holmes notoriously
quipped, “[e]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked.”158 But distinguishing between being stumbled over due to
carelessness and being stumbled over based on a fluke in the environment is
much, much harder.159 We can almost always find a way to conclude that the
actor failed to take sufficient care. This is not true with the mental states of
intent or knowledge. When someone kills or assaults someone, the actus reus
may itself reveal the mens rea of intent.160 Take for example cases of burglary
or assault. People do not typically break a bedroom window, and then
accidentally sell the diamond jewelry they found. We do not accidentally
make plans to repeatedly get women alone, and then to drug and rape them.
While there are many instances of intentional crimes where the
defendant claims it was “all just a misunderstanding”— the circumstantial
manifestations of intent (planning, physical force, property damage, violence,
deception, repetition, covering up) are easier for us to see than when someone
should have realized a risk. Foreseeability rarely has externally observable
counterparts. It is much more ethereal than intent or recklessness, and harder
to prove. Nevertheless, because of its centrality to moral and legal judgments,
it is critical we try. Millions of dollars ride on the distinction between
carelessness and freak accidents, and yet we struggle to reliably distinguish
the two.
5. Where are the freak accidents?
When my son (ever-the example for mens rea ascriptions, unlike my
daughter who was less wily) was about 18-months old, he picked up my new
Apple watch, threw it in the toilet, and flushed roughly $500 down the drain.
He giggled, and thought we should be impressed. My husband, on the other

158

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW at p. 3 (1881).
Even some studies conflate unforeseeable and foreseeable accidents, despite the
distinction between the two being morally (and legally) relevant. See, Brooke Hilton and Valerie
Kuhlmeier, Intention Attribution and the Development of Moral Evaluation, 9 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 1, 3
(2019)
160
Fiery Cushman, Deconstructing Intent to Reconstruct Morality, 6 Curr. Opinion in
Psychol. 103, 103 (2015)
159
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hand, was incensed. With an understanding that our son could not be held
accountable, he quickly figured out a way to blame me. Why had I “let him”
do this? How could I leave this watch on our bathroom counter, within reach?
Why did you not purchase the expensive Apple Care plan? Surely, there must
be something I could have done to prevent this, and conceivably there was.
But at this point, our son was not tall enough to reach the counter on
his own. He must have used a chair or an unidentified toddler-tool to slide it
off. It was not reasonably foreseeable to me that our son would flush
something down the toilet, as he’d never done anything like that before.
Possible, sure. Probable? No. This, to me, was just one of life’s many freak
accidents. But my husband’s readiness to infer negligence turns out to not be
at all uncommon.
Often, a terrible turn of events unfolds where no one is to blame.
Common sense tells us that lots of injuries likely involve “true” accidents—
where neither party was at technically unreasonable nor at fault. And yet,
cases or news reports saying as much are rare.161 The fact that we do not see
more reported cases of true, fluke accidents that are resolved by a finding of
“no breach,” suggests that when the outcome is bad enough, we might
incorrectly be doing what my husband did. And indeed, a mountain of
research suggests that this is exactly what many of us do. When outcomes are
bad, outrage over the plaintiff’s horrible injury leads some jurors to be too
quick to place blame at the feet of defendants who could not have foreseen
or prevented this kind of harm.162

161
There are some interesting facts involved in cases where the insured asks for a
“pure accident” instruction, which is most common when physical elements like snow, ice, or rain,
make an accident possible despite the use of due care. However, even in “freak” accident cases, judges
are reluctant to give the instruction. See, Lakin v. Daniel Marr & Son Co., 732 F.2d 233, 237–38 (1st
Cir. 1984); For a discussion of two examples of opinions issued by Judge Cardozo, where he reversed
negligence verdicts because the evidence of foreseeable harm was insufficient, see, John E.
Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects
Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15, 43 (2006) For two more modern cases that found
that the accident was simply a “freak” occurrence, see Borella v. Renfro, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 137
N.E.3d 431 (2019), review denied, 483 Mass. 1108, 141 N.E.3d 89 (2020); Guzman v. Spence, 1998
WL 35276219, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 15, 1998) Kim v. State, No. W201901027COAR3CV, 2020 WL
6375875, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2020), appeal denied (Mar. 23, 2021) . Another court tells us
that just because an accident is “freakish,” does not mean that the defendant will escape liability, as
long as “through the exercise of reasonable diligence [he] should have foreseen, the general manner in
which the injury or loss occurred.”
162
Marine Buon, et al., A Non-Mentalistic Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social
Evaluations, 126 Cognition 149, 153 (2013).
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This occurs because people are “intuitive prosecutors” and do not wait
to hear all of the facts before deciding someone needs to be blamed.163 We
quickly enter “blame validation mode,” where perceived culpability is not
just an output of the blaming process, but is also an input.164 Information that
mitigates blame is discounted while we cling to information that inflates
foreseeability.165 This is accomplished by either exaggerating our perceptions
of what the defendant should have foreseen, or simply reducing the threshold
for how much evidence of either is required for blame.166 Because
foreseeability is such a malleable construct and hard to prove through
circumstantial evidence, it provides a terrific opportunity for blaming people
when we have a bad outcome plus a strong reason—perhaps based in racist,
sexist, ageist, ableist, or classist stereotypes—to do so.
DECONSTRUCTING PSYCHOLOGICAL FORESIGHT
When jurors are in “blame validation mode” they will leapfrog over
the inquiry of could the defendant have foreseen a risk and jump straight to
the question of should he have. These two inquiries must be kept distinct, and
the psychology of legal foresight can help us focus the jury’s attention on
whether foresight was even possible, as opposed to normatively desirable.
Given that legal foresight is poorly developed and conceptually thin, we are
fortunate that it maps directly onto the psychological concept of foresight,
where researchers have done much of the conceptual work for us.

163

Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe, Neural evidence for “intuitive
prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. 6 SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE 302, 310
164
Mark Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556, 564
(2000)
165
Philip J. Mazzocco , Mark D. Alicke & Teresa L. Davis, On the Robustness of Outcome
Bias: No Constraint by Prior Culpability, 26 BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 131, 145 (2004)
166
Andrew Monroe and Bertram Malle, People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of
Blame, 116 J. OF PERSON. AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 215, at p. 5 (2019). Mark Alicke, David Rose, & Dori
Bloom, Causation, norm violation and culpable control, 108 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 108, 670, 675
(2011)
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Episodic foresight is a psychological construct helps us plan for
outcomes that are imminent, near or distant.167 It is the “capacity to imagine
or simulate events that might occur in one’s personal future” and to plan our
behavior accordingly.168 It works by enabling us to 1) construct a mental
representation of a future event, 2) predict the likelihood of it occurring, 3)
set an action goal and 4) organize steps for following through on the plan.169
When this process is slow and deliberate, it gives us “an apparent sense of
free will.”170 But when it happens quickly, we barely notice it.171
In negligence cases where the defendant has little time to react, the
voluntary actions that cause harm may be “phenomenally thin”—meaning
that the actor’s mental states might not be that vivid or conscious. 172 In these
cases, the process of foresight might be taken for granted, as the “neural
computations that produce this experience are so efficient and so familiar that
our sense of agency can seem to be minimal and banal.173 This can make it
very hard to infer whether foresight was subjectively possible. Perhaps even
the actor is not aware of his own foresight calculations. And yet, if the

167

See, Lia Kvavilashvili and Jan Rummel, On the Nature of Everyday Prospection: A
Review and Theoretical Integration of Research on Mind-Wandering, Future Thinking, and
Prospective Memory, 24 REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 210, 212 (2020); Cole, S., Kvavilashvili,
L. Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: a dual process account. Psychological
Research 85, 464–479 (2021).
168
Daniel L Schacter, Roland G Benoit, Karl K Szpunar, Episodic future thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 41, ** (2017)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.06.002.
169
Aspects of foresight are referred to as episodic future thinking, simulation, prospection,
or even “mental time travel”. Here, episodic foresight is the construct that mirrors foreseeability in
negligence, while mental time travel and simulation are component parts. See, Lia Kvavilashvili
and Jan Rummel, On the Nature of Everyday Prospection: A Review and Theoretical Integration of
Research on Mind-Wandering, Future Thinking, and Prospective Memory, 24 REVIEW OF GENERAL
PSYCHOLOGY 210, 212 (2020); see also Federica Conti, Muireann Irish, Harnessing Visual Imagery
and Oculomotor Behaviour to Understand Prospection, 25 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 272, 272
(2021); Beyon Miloyen and Kimberley McFarlane, The Measurement of Episodic Foresight: a
systematic review of assessment instruments, 117 CORTEX 351, 351 (2019).
170
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 135 (2013)
171
See, Lia Kvavilashvili and Jan Rummel, On the Nature of Everyday Prospection: A
Review and Theoretical Integration of Research on Mind-Wandering, Future Thinking, and
Prospective Memory, 24 REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 210, 212 (2020); Cole, S., Kvavilashvili,
L. Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: a dual process account. Psychological
Research 85, 464–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7
172
Patrick Haggard, Sense of agency in the human brain 18 Nature Rev. Neurosci. 197, 197
(2017) https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2017.14
173
Patrick Haggard, Sense of agency in the human brain 18 Nature Rev. Neurosci. 197, 197
(2017) https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2017.14
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negligence standard is committed to tailoring blame to whether a bad
outcome was preventable because it was foreseeable, then we need to at least
provide jurors with some evidence of the necessary components of foresight,
whether they were possibly met in this case, and how often human foresight
leads to inaccurate predictions.
In legally relevant contexts when we anticipate the future and
foresee a general type of bad outcome, we must operationalize episodic
foresight. In recent years, the concept has “garnered substantial interest from
researchers of cognition, neuropsychology, and neuroscience”174 where we
have learned many of its psychological and neural mechanisms.175 Episodic
foresight relies on “a complex suite” of “concurrent function of multiple
cognitive and neural systems.”176 Foresight is decidedly a mental
phenomenon, with necessary inputs from the actor’s past, present, and
predicted future mental states.
1. Foreseeability is an epistemic state, and assessing it requires jurors to read
minds
Let’s imagine you are late leaving for the airport and are driving on a
curvy highway in the early morning hours. In the fog, you approach a car up
ahead that appears to be stopped in the middle of the road. You must decide
whether to try to drive around the car, hit the brakes, stop to offer help, or
stay the course. How do you make this decision? Episodic foresight.
Episodic foresight involves multiple mental states: perception,
attention, knowledge, memory, awareness, scene simulation, and the ability
to predict and weigh probabilities of outcomes to execute a plan.177 If we err
in any of these processes, we may hit the stopped or an oncoming car, which

174

Cole, S., Kvavilashvili, L. Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: a dual process
account. 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 464–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7
175
Brendan Gaesser, Kerri Keeler, Liane Young, Moral imagination: Facilitating prosocial
decision-making through scene imagery and theory of mind, 171 Cognition 180 (2018)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.11.004.
176
Beyon Miloyan, Nancy A. Pachana & Thomas Suddendorf, The future is here: A review
of foresight systems in anxiety and depression, 28 Cognition and Emotion, 795, 795796, (2014)
177
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41, (2017); Daniel M Wolpert and
Michael S Landy, Motor control is decision-making, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 996
(2012)
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could result in negligence liability for “unreasonable conduct.”178 But given
these critical mental inputs to foresight, it would be incorrect to think of this
breach as being based just on physical acts. Failing to apply the brakes
quickly enough contains within it necessary mental state elements, as I will
demonstrate.
a. Foresight requires perception
Episodic foresight requires perception. When we approach the car in
the fog, we must be able to accurately attend to and interpret sensory inputs,
such as the distance between our cars, the width of the shoulder on the curve,
the location of other cars that might be affected, and the road conditions.179
This requires rapid perceptual processing.180 We visually scan our
surroundings, listen for cues, feel tactile inputs, have a healthy sense of our
bodies in space (which is called proprioception), and send all of this feedback
to our brain. There it is processed into preparatory action for us to
move.181 When we make a deliberate choice and move in the way that we
planned, we increase midbrain dopamine, which gives us a sense of reward,
and later, agency.182 Even when someone is clumsy, this is fundamentally an
issue with coordinating “mismatches between the predicted and actual
sensory signals” in the brain. 183 It is not a purely physical thing.
Human perception is complex and sensitive, but not error proof.
Because it is a cognitive function, it can be impaired when our brains are
taxed. Even healthy people “fail to notice highly conspicuous events” when

178
Eckelberry v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 402 F. Supp. 2d 704, 714 (S.D.W. Va. 2005), rev'd,
469 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[E]very car crash may be traced to some failure of judgment that fully
reveals its dangers only when it is too late. That is precisely why they are accidents.”)
179
Rafiq Huda, et al., Distinct prefrontal top-down circuits differentially modulate
sensorimotor behavior 11 Nat. Commun. 1, 1 (2020). (“Though seemingly simple, goal-oriented
sensorimotor behaviors require coordination of multiple processes.”)
180
Nathan J. Wispinski, Jason P. Gallivan, and Craig S. Chapman, Models, movements, and
minds: bridging the gap between decision making and action, 1464 Ann. New York Acad. Sci. 30
(2018),
181
Daniel J. Gale, J. Randall Flanagan, Jason P. Gallivan, Human Somatosensory Cortex Is
Modulated during Motor Planning, 41 Journal of Neuroscience 5909, 5920 (2021)
182

Dopamine reward prediction error codes perception
Stefania Sarno, Victor de Lafuente, Ranulfo Romo, Néstor Parga
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Nov 2017, 114 (48) E10494-E10503;
183
Daniel J. Gale, J. Randall Flanagan, Jason P. Gallivan, Human Somatosensory Cortex Is
Modulated during Motor Planning
41 Journal of Neuroscience 5909, 5910 (2021)
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they focus attention on another event.184 When we have to visually search
large sets, discriminate between similar colors and shapes, and calculate
distances at the same time, this is referred to as “perceptual load.” Perceptual
load can make us blind to obstacles in the road, or make us incapable of
counting items in our path. These things would be obvious to a jury in
hindsight, if their perception is not being taxed.
Healthy people experience variation in how they perceive the world.
Individual differences in visual perception “range from slight, and perhaps
random, fluctuations in performance across individuals, to considerable
dissimilarities that can be reliably traced to broader group differences in, for
example, gender, personality, culture, motivation, and the spectrum of
psychosis.”185 Stable individual differences in visual perception can stem
from “genetic makeup… as well as neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
markers.186 For example, people perceive colors differently, have different
sensitivities to contrast, organize and ensemble inputs differently, and draw
very different meanings from what they see.187 When our motivation or
expectation is strong enough, “it can even result in the perception of
something that is not actually present.”188 In sum, while perception is critical
for foresight, this process is highly subjective and individualized to the person
and to the contemporaneous setting under perceptual load.
b. Foresight requires episodic memory
There is a tight psychological and neurobiological link between
remembering episodes from our past and foreseeing the future. Indeed,

184

Joshua Eayrs and Nilli Lavie, Establishing Individual Differences in Perceptual Capacity,
44. J. of Exper. Psychol. 1240, 1240, 1255 (2018)
185
Timea Partos, Simon Cropper, David Rawlings, You Don’t See What I See: Individual
Differences in the Perception of Meaning from Visual Stimuli. 11 PLoS ONE e0150615 (2016)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0150615
186
Kadi Tulver, The factorial structure of individual differences in visual perception, 73
Consciousness and Cognition 102762 (2019) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102762.
187

Kadi Tulver, The factorial structure of individual differences in visual perception, 73
Consciousness and Cognition 102762 (2019) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102762.
188
Kadi Tulver, et al., Individual differences in the effects of priors on perception: A multiparadigm approach, 187 Cognition 167, 168 (2019)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.03.008.167
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“memories are the building blocks of [foresight].”189 For example, if we are
trying to imagine how our next dentist visit is likely to go, we draw upon our
memories from our last visit. Deciding how to respond to the stopped car in
the fog requires memory of how you and your car have behaved in these
situations in the past, and your memory for driving on this particular road. If
you do not have any episodic memory of the road ahead or the sensitivity of
this car’s brakes, it will be much harder to foresee possible outcomes.
Episodic memories come from past personal experiences or events.190
They provide the source material for future planning, where we flexibly cut
and paste past events together to simulate possible futures.191 Common
memory errors stem from “mistakenly combining elements of distinct past
experiences.” 192
Episodic memory is critical for foresight,193 and there is a tight
function connection between the two.194This is “why amnesiacs who have
trouble with retrospection tend to have trouble with prospection [foresight]
as well”195 If we cannot remember, we cannot foresee. In fact, we might have
evolved strong memory systems not so much to keep accurate records of the
past, but to travel back to past events to mentally travel into the future.196

189
Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 135 (2007)
190
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41, (2017).
191
Brendan Gaesser, Kerri Keeler, Liane Young, Moral imagination: Facilitating prosocial
decision-making through scene imagery and theory of mind, 171 Cognition 180 (2018); Daniel
Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking: mechanisms and functions, 17
CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41, (2017); Daniel M Wolpert and Michael S Landy, Motor control
is decision-making, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 996 (2012)
192
Alexis Carpenter & Daniel Schacter, Flexible retrieval: When true inferences produce
false memories, 43 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION,
335–349 (2017).
193
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41 (2017).
194
Preston P. Thakral, Kevin P. Madore and Daniel L. Schacter, A Role for the Left Angular
Gyrus in Episodic Simulation and Memory, 37 J. of Neurosci. 8142, 8142 (2017)
195
Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 135 (2007)
196
Daniel Schacter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 42 (2017). See, Wenwen Yang and
Yaozhong Liu, Improving Maladaptive Behavior: The Effect of Episodic Foresight in Delay
Discounting and Its Mechanism, 10 PSYCHOLOGY 19 (2019)
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Memory allows us to mentally “replay” past events to “pre-play” future
events.197
If a defendant possessed an episodic memory that should have alerted
them to the risk of injury—say as a physician who repeated a specific
procedure with known complications—then this might render the bad
outcome more foreseeable. However, the future “regularly dishes up
situations that are entirely novel” and in this case “representing novel future
events requires more than just a system that projects the past into the
future.”198 In these cases, we must rely on semantic knowledge to say whether
the bad outcome was foreseeable. Semantic knowledge consists of general,
background memories that might not be connected to having personally
experienced an event.
c. Foresight requires semantic knowledge and schemas
Perhaps more than any other mental state, foresight relies on semantic
knowledge.199 We cannot predict the future without some information about
the past.200 Researchers believe that semantic knowledge provides the mental
scaffolding for foresight, given that patients with semantic dementia (no
semantic memory, but preserved episodic memory) struggle with
foresight..201

197

Brendan Gaesser, Episodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of
imagined and remembered events, 203 Cognition 104325 (2020).
198
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 136 (2013)
199
Sean Laurent, Narina Nunez, and Kimberly Schweitzer, The Influence of Desire and
Knowledge on Perception of Each Other and Related Mental States and Different Mechanisms for
Blame, 60 J. Exp. Social Psych. 27, 28 (2015) “[T]o know that one’s action will have a particular
consequence, one must first know that certain types of actions or classes of actions have the potential
to bring about certain types of outcomes or classes of outcomes. Using this definition, knowledge
informs subjective foreseeability.”
200
“If the defendant ‘knew or should have known that its act was likely to result in harm to
someone’ then the injury was foreseeable. Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 597 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio
1992). “[T]he test [for foreseeability] is, would the ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing
what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm .” See, Osborn v. City of Waterbury, 220
A.3d 1, 6–7 (Conn. 2019); “[T]he main way to demonstrate foreseeability is to point to similar
incidents in the past that the defendant knew or should have known about.” Houston v. Frog's Rest.,
LLC (D.P.R. Jan. 13, 2021).
201
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41, (2017); Daniel M Wolpert and
Michael S Landy, Motor control is decision-making, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 996
(2012)
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Semantic representations, or background knowledge, help us put
things into context of what we know about the world and what generally
makes sense. These representations include mental categories, schemas, gist,
and narratives which provide a script for how the upcoming events may
unfold.202 If I were trying to calculate the likelihood or potential impact of a
hurricane in my area, it would be impossible if I had no knowledge of past
hurricanes patterns. Semantic knowledge can be acquired second-hand.
Semantic knowledge helps us pre-experience events that we’ve never
actually experienced.203 For example, semantic knowledge tells us that
“chocolate pudding would taste better with cinnamon than dill,” or “that it
would be painful to go an hour without blinking.”204 Of course, the
conclusions we draw from our schemas are not always correct, but they
provide useful bases for prediction. Without these schemas, our predictions
would be poor.
In the case of approaching the car that is stopped, we will rely on
semantic knowledge and schemas to make predictions as to outcomes. We
will quickly recall how cars generally behave, how roads are laid out, how
we control the steering wheel, and how traffic tends to move to help us decide
what is foreseeable and how we should act. These schemas can be helpful,
even though we may have never encountered a vehicle stopped ahead of us.205
Foresight is possible because we are capable of learning from our own past
events, and extrapolating the general, essential features to simulate outcomes
in the future.206
If the jury hears about the defendant’s lack of relevant semantic
knowledge (such as knowledge that the center of gravity on his car would not
allow for quick correction in steering) the driver might escape liability. In
contrast, he would more likely be liable if his tires blew as he was trying to

202
Donna Rose Addis, Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation,
11 REV. OF PHIL AND PSYCHOL. 233, 235 (2020).
203
Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 135 (2007)
204
Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 135 (2007)
205
Thomas Suddendorf, Foresight and Evolution of the Human Mind, 312 SCIENCE 1006,
1006 (2006).
206
Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351, 135 (2007) 1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3898109

2-Aug-21]

Making Sense of Accidents

39

stop, and he knew that his tires could be bald based on a warning from an
auto-mechanic.207
Many cases describe why an injury was foreseeable by calling upon
the actual, semantic knowledge of the defendant.208 Consider a case, where a
gas station owner was found liable for negligence. The court argued the
owner should have foreseen a battery on his premises, because he knew that
a group of boys were “pretty high” on drugs, “were gathered just outside the
store where he could not see them,” and one of them had a knife.209 This
subjective knowledge created a reasonably foreseeable risk, and a duty to do
more than sit back and watch events unfold. This was based in part on
expectations that the owner should have activated a schema for how loitering
boys who use drugs with weapons tend to behave; he had no episodic memory
of this exact scenario. Using subjective past knowledge to inform
foreseeability allows us to “trace back” the present negligence to previous
knowledge, which created an obligation to do something to prevent
foreseeable harm.210 Even after jurors assess the subjective lack of foresight
of a defendant, they still might not want to forgive defendants who ignore
epistemic obligations to be careful, as it might be unreasonable to fail to
attend to a red flag.
d. Can semantic knowledge or episodic memory be objectively imputed to
a defendant?
Now that we appreciate the critical role of semantic knowledge in
assessing foreseeability, we must explore whether it can be imputed when it
is not actually there. Put differently, we must ask whether it is appropriate in
negligence to find a defendant liable not for information he subjectively
knew, but for information he should have known.
i.

Objectively reasonably foreseeable harm can be inferred from the actor’s
conduct, if we can assume the defendant has semantic knowledge of the risk

207
Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Haw. 1, 18, 986 P.2d 288, 305 (1999) (explaining how a
corporate defendant could be liable for negligence because of its past subjective knowledge of a faulty
tire inspection process).
208
See, Chaikin v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., No. 02 C 6596, 2003 WL 21003715, at *3
(N.D. Ill. May 1, 2003)
209
Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 Mass. 62, 72–73, 616 N.E.2d 1068, 1075–76 (1993)
210
Osborn v. City of Waterbury, 333 Conn. 816, 825–26, 220 A.3d 1, 6–7 (2019)
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If someone drives 100 mph through a crowded school zone, this is
objectively unreasonably risky. So too is jokingly pointing a gun at
someone’s head.211 If the risk precipitates, these are cases where the actus
reus provides clear circumstantial evidence of the mens rea of at least
negligence. We assume the actor has semantic knowledge that guns can
misfire, and schools are full of kids with inferior perception and reaction
times.
In these cases, we may not stop to realize we are drawing inferences
about the defendants’ mental states. But we are. Because the risk of driving
100 mph is so well known, it is unreasonable for anyone to drive this fast in
a school zone. Even in the rare situation where the defendant failed to
subjectively realize these risks, they may be attached as conditions on the
social contract of driving.212 Thus, in some cases it might be fair to impute
semantic knowledge to the defendant, based on his conduct. Either way,
judges and juries cannot decide if the harm was foreseeable, without
interrogating what the defendant knew or should have known.
If the activity that constitutes breach is a failure of our “procedural
epistemic obligations” then this needs to be abundantly clear. To explain why
this matters, let’s consider an example. GEICO, a car insurance company,
was sued for insuring someone who caused an accident. The plaintiff argued
the driver was too risky and it was careless for GEICO to have insured her.
GEICO knew the insured had been cited for driving without a license.213
However, the judge also argued that GEICO was negligent because they
could have gathered information, which would have revealed that the insured
was not “stable” and was sleeping on a mattress on someone else’s floor. One
wonders how GEICO was meant to discern this, and moreover how that
information would inform how careful of a driver she was. But in any event,
the court imputed this knowledge to GEICO that it apparently did not have.
GEICO was found to be negligent because it should have foreseen that the

211

Klop v. Vanden Bos, 263 Mich. 27, 28, 248 N.W. 538, 538 (1933); Arnold v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 1992); State v. Easley, 2008-Ohio-468 (2008)
212
For a thoughtful explanation of the “social contract theory” of tort, and how
reasonableness canons “apply to a plurality of free and equal persons who seek to advance their diverse
aims and aspirations on fair terms,” see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (1996)
213
GEICO Indem. Co. v. Whiteside, No. S21Q0227, 2021 WL 1521527, at *8 (Ga. Apr. 19,
2021) (The court does not explain why GEICO would have had access to this kind of information, but
it seems quite unlikely they knew, or should have known, these details.)
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driver was too risky to insure, based on knowledge it did not actually possess.
Without being explicit about this, this analysis converted the case to an
affirmative duty to investigate, rather than a duty of misfeasance for careless
issuance of insurance. Reframing the duty and breach should alter the
analysis of causation and injury. Now the plaintiff must show that had
GEICO investigated the driver better, this would have led them not to insure
her, which ostensibly would have prevented the accident (though there
remains a problem with causation, as drivers who are really that risky will
probably drive without insurance).
While reframing the duty is not uncommon for judges to do, in this
case it also significantly, and erroneously, alters the mental state requirement
from negligence to knowledge. We are no longer “tracing back” the current
negligence to past subjective knowledge. Instead, we are converting the
prospective nature of foreseeability into a test that can require retrospective
data-gathering.
This might be justified in some negligence cases, as we could be
negligent for burying our heads in the sand once we have been put on notice
of a risk. But we should be more explicit about this conversion, so plaintiffs
meet their burden of proving that defendants had a duty to gather this
information, that obtaining the necessary information was even possible, and
the failure to do so was itself unreasonable. In the GEICO case, there was no
explanation of why it was unreasonable for the insurance company not to do
more investigative work on their insured. Skipping this necessary step could
lead to imposing liability in cases where it’s unreasonable to expect the
defendant to gather this data.
An even stranger blurring of negligence with knowledge occurs when
courts require the plaintiff to prove, as opposed to permit the plaintiff to
prove, that the defendant should have had knowledge that his act or omission
involved danger to another. Whereas the previous use of knowledge in the
GEICO case looked to antecedent facts, this shift requires knowledge as to
outcomes. This move has not been sufficiently justified by either judges or
tort scholars, despite being acknowledged in the draft third Restatement of
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Torts214 and even the American Law Reports.215 Because courts fail to
recognize that foresight requires mindreading, they are bungling the analysis
by relying on irrelevant mental states.
e. Foresight requires the ability to weigh and predict uncertain outcomes
Determining what is foreseeable requires making decisions under
uncertainty, as negligence liability assumes no certainty or knowledge as to
outcomes.216 We rarely have prior probability estimates. Instead, actors must
do their best to guess as to what the likely outcomes are. Of course, jurors
have access to what occurred, which clouds the prior probability analysis with
hindsight.
Let’s return to the hypothetical driver in the fog. When we need to
decide how to act in a split-second, we first simulate the possible actions,
then assign values to each, which are encoded in the supplementary motor
cortex.217 Values are based on external factors such as “outcomes and their
probability of occurrence,” but also on what matters to us—emotionally and
personally.218 This weighing of outcomes is often based on “fast and frugal
heuristics.” 219 For example, if an outcome quickly comes to mind, we may
confuse this with its being objectively more likely to occur.220

214
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm Section 3, comment j (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005); See, Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1250 (2009)
215
“[M]an cannot be held responsible on the theory of negligence for an injury from an act
or omission on his part unless it appears that he had knowledge or reasonably was chargeable with
knowledge that the act or omission involved danger to another.” D.E. Buckner, Foreseeability as an
element of negligence and proximate cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (Originally published in 1965)
216
Klaus Wunderlich, Antonio Rangel, John P. O'Doherty, Neural computations underlying
action-based decision making in the human brain, 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 17199-17204 (2017); Amber Dunning, et al., The Tuning of Human Motor Response to Risk
in a Dynamic Environment Task, 10 PLoS ONE e0125461 (2015)
217
Klaus Wunderlich, Antonio Rangel, John P. O'Doherty, Neural computations underlying
action-based decision making in the human brain, 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 17199, 17202 (2009);
218
Giovanni Pezzulo & Francesco Rigoli, The Value of Foresight: How Prospection Affects
Decision-Making, 5 Frontiers in Neuroscience 79 (2011) (parentheses omitted)
219
Adam Bulley, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf, Prospection and the Present
Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed
Rewards, 20 Rev. of General Psychol. 29, 37 (2016)
220
Adam Bulley, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf, Prospection and the Present
Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed
Rewards, 20 Rev. of General Psychol. 29, 37 (2016)
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When accuracy and utility conflict, our brains are biased toward
personal utility.221 We might drive differently if there were fellow teenagers
in the car, because peer-pressure sways us to be riskier.222 Or, we might be
much more cautious to protect a young child or new car. We might also put
a great deal of value on not missing our flight if we are trying to make our
grandma’s funeral.223
Ultimately, our choices are driven by predicted rewards and
punishments, and the imagined feeling that it will gives us.224 This is
mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which is the
“arbiter of emotional value to future-oriented scenarios.225 Some of us are
extremely guilt or fear avoidant, and will choose not to pursue certain goals
if it means we might experience even a small amount of these emotions.226
Others of us will choose immediate smaller rewards over larger, but more
delayed ones.227 Depending on someone’s circumstances, immediate gains
may be more rational than delaying gratification,228 and we cannot say that
avoiding guilt is careless. Because the evaluation process is so idiosyncratic,
there is no such thing as an “objectively reasonable” decision.

221

Joshua Martin, Mark Solms and Phillipp Sterzer, Useful misrepresentation: perception as
embodied proactive inference, TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES (2021). Thus, the process does not apply
Bayesian reasoning.
222
Maria Jose Rodrigo, et al., Adolescents’ risky decision-making activates neural networks
related to social cognition and cognitive control processes, Front. 8 Hum. Neurosci. 1,1 (2014)
223
Daniel M Wolpert and Michael S Landy, Motor control is decision-making, 22
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 996 (2012)
224
Giovanni Pezzulo & Francesco Rigoli, The Value of Foresight: How Prospection Affects
Decision-Making, 5 Frontiers in Neuroscience 79 (2011) DOI=10.3389/fnins.2011.00079
225
Beyon Miloyan, Nancy A. Pachana & Thomas Suddendorf, The future is here: A review
of foresight systems in anxiety and depression, 28 Cognition and Emotion, 795, 800 (2014)
226
Giovanni Pezzulo & Francesco Rigoli, The Value of Foresight: How Prospection Affects
Decision-Making, 5 Frontiers in Neuroscience 79 (2011) DOI=10.3389/fnins.2011.00079
227
Adam Bulley, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf, Prospection and the Present
Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed
Rewards, 20 Rev. of General Psychol. 29, 39 (2016)
228
Adam Bulley, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf, Prospection and the Present
Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed
Rewards, 20 Rev. of General Psychol. 29, 33 (2016) (Recent evidence suggests that engaging in
episodic foresight while making intertemporal choices can result in significantly reduced rates of delay
discounting, but it might be because episodic foresight encourages flexibility and imagination.)
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After factoring in all of these inputs, we must then reduce the many
options to one plan.229 Let’s assume that we decide to hit the brakes hard and
veer slightly to the right,230 because this seems to avoid the worst outcomes.
Our body implements this strategy by engaging our motor cortex, which tells
specific fibers and muscles to physically press the brake pedal and turn the
wheel.231 Far from being slow and deliberate, the entire decision-making
process can occur in under 200ms.232 But the process can also go awry at any
one of these steps.
Just as with the sensory feedback system, the outcome of the option
that is selected can be tracked for prediction errors, to monitor whether we
made the right choice, and to learn from this experience.233 Maybe the car
skid more than we expected, and hit a rock. Maybe in the fog we could not
see a cyclist in the shoulder that we have now hit with our car. While we had
to consider multiple unknown possibilities and weigh them for likelihood and
personal value, jurors will have the benefit of knowing what in fact occurred.
This is not something that children can do. Toddlers cannot perform
complex scene construction, visualize themselves in the future, or compare
multiple future actions, each of which is required for foresight.234 By about
age 4, children can usually distinguish between near future events (like
dinner) and distant future events (like driving a car);235 however, their sense

229

Nathan J. Wispinski, Jason P. Gallivan, and Craig S. Chapman, Models, movements, and
minds: bridging the gap between decision making and action, 1464 Ann. New York Acad. Sci. 30
(2018)
230
Tomohisa Asai, Know thy agency in predictive coding: Meta-monitoring over forward
modeling,
51
Consciousness
and
Cognition,
82,
83
(2017)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.001.
231
Hyosub E. Kim, Guy Avraham, and Richard B. Ivry, The Psychology of Reaching: Action
Selection, Movement Implementation, and Sensorimotor Learning, 72 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 61–95
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051053;(Explaining how neuroscientific
computations are required to prepare our motor areas to act)
232
Hyosub E. Kim, Guy Avraham, and Richard B. Ivry, The Psychology of Reaching: Action
Selection, Movement Implementation, and Sensorimotor Learning, 72 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 61–95
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051053; Jason P. Gallivan, et al., Decisionmaking in sensorimotor control, 19 Nature Rev. Neuroscience 519 (2018)
233
Neural computations underlying action-based decision making in the human brain,
Klaus Wunderlich, Antonio Rangel, John P. O'Doherty Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences Oct 2009, 106 (40) 17199-17204;
234
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 137 (2013)
235
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 138 (2013)
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of time is still not well-calibrated and they may think their birthday is right
around the corner, even though they just celebrated it.236 Only by about age
5 can children project themselves and others into specific 3-D future contexts,
and to evaluate predicted actions accordingly.237 If we think that negligence
liability should rest on the foreseeability of general harms, then most kids
under age 5-6 should not be liable for this reason—not because they are
incapable of breach or because others are put on notice of their physical
awkwardness. They should not be liable because they lack the capacity for
episodic foresight.
2. There are significant individual differences in the components of episodic
foresight
Even among the healthy population, there are differences in our
ability to foresee outcomes.238 Even within the same person, our capacity for
foresight can be manipulated to be better with experimental priming.239
People with better memories and higher scores on executive function tasks
have fewer false negatives for predicting future events, but also more false
positives.240 Cognitive inflexibility also leads to difficulties imagining the
future. This is associated with advanced age but can exist in younger and
healthy adults.241 Difficulty seeing images in one’s “mind’s eye” also predicts

236
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 138 (2013)
237
Laura Hanson & Cristina Atance, Brief Report: Episodic Foresight in Autism Spectrum
Disorder, 44 J Autism Dev Disord 674, 674 (2014)
238
Arnaud D’Argembeau, et al, Component processes underlying future thinking, 38
Memory & Cognition 809, 810 (2010) 9
239
Daniel Schachter, Roland Benoit, and Karl Szpunar, Episodic Future Thinking:
mechanisms and functions, 17 CURR. OPINION IN BEHAV. Sci 41, 41, (2017); Daniel M Wolpert and
Michael S Landy, Motor control is decision-making, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 996
(2012) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.05.003
240
Arnaud D’Argembeau, et al, Component processes underlying future thinking, 38
Memory & Cognition 809, 810 (2010) 9
241
R.P. Roberts, K. Wiebels, R.L. Sumner, V. van Mulukom, C.L. Grady, D.L. Schacter,
D.R. Addis, An fMRI investigation of the relationship between future imagination and cognitive
flexibility, 95 Neuropsychologia 156, 156 (2017)
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impairments in foresight.242 Children and adults with autism spectrum
disorder perform worse on some episodic foresight tasks.243
People with social anxiety”244 and depression struggle to foresee the
future. Researchers hypothesize that these disorders may actually be
principally caused by differences in episodic foresight, as people are more
likely to retrieve negative information and foresee the future as being
worse.245 They may do this in part by attending more to “threat-related and
negative information” when thinking about foreseeable events.246 However,
as healthy individuals are prone to an optimism bias, where we consistently
exaggerate the plausibility of positive events, we cannot say that individuals
with anxiety or depression are per se unreasonable or even wrong. In addition
to great variation between healthy individuals, a huge subsection of our
population that is older, depressed, autistic, anxious, or experiences cognitive
inflexibility, will struggle to foresee the future.
3. Healthy Adults Make Errors in Foresight Predictions
Even healthy adults have been shown to be pretty terrible at foresight.
In general, humans foresee “more positive future events than one can
extrapolate rationally from past events.”247 This bias is linked to speciﬁc
neural correlates, and may have “profound selective advantages over more
negative but realistic expectations.” 248 Perhaps if we realistically assessed
how bad risky outcomes were likely to be, we would never take risks,

242
“As with memory, imagery abilities vary considerably in the healthy population at large,
… individuals can be situated along a continuum of imagery strength ranging from completely absent
(aphantasia) to extremely strong and photo-like (hyperphantasia)” Federica Conti, Muireann Irish,
Harnessing Visual Imagery and Oculomotor Behaviour to Understand Prospection, 25 Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 272, 272 (2021)
243
Laura Hanson & Cristina Atance, Brief Report: Episodic Foresight in Autism Spectrum
Disorder, 44 J Autism Dev Disord 674–677 (2014)
244
Alexandra M. Opriş, Lavinia Cheie & Laura Visu-Petra (2021) Back to the future: relating
the development of episodic future thinking to cognitive and affective individual differences and to
motivational relevance in preschoolers, Memory, 29:3, 362-378,
245
Beyon Miloyan, Nancy A. Pachana & Thomas Suddendorf, The future is here: A review
of foresight systems in anxiety and depression, 28 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 795, 799, (2014)
246
Beyon Miloyan, Nancy A. Pachana & Thomas Suddendorf, The future is here: A review
of foresight systems in anxiety and depression, 28 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 795, 799, (2014)
247
Thomas Suddendorf, Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and
differences, 1 WIRES COGNITIVE SCIENCE 99, 102 (2009)
248
Thomas Suddendorf, Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and
differences, 1 WIRES COGNITIVE SCIENCE 99, 102 (2009)
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experiment and grow. This bias likely leads to universal discounting ex ante
of negative outcomes.
Foresight predictions are thus “often wrong in innumerable ways.” 249
The future is inherently uncertain, and we do our best to predict what may
unfold. But we live in complex societies, where even the healthiest among us
are constantly perceptually and cognitively overloaded. As a species, we are
pretty objectively lousy at foresight. We also often lack awareness as to the
full scope of our actions.250 Jurors should be instructed on the errors in
awareness and perception, rather than assuming for blame-validation
purposes that all stimuli could have and should have been perceived. But
because jurors are not tuned in to the necessary components of foresight, and
how fallible each of them is, jurors likely fail to calibrate “reasonable
foreseeability” to someone who is actually pretty bad at it.
4. How much jurors are allowed to “subjectivize” the standard for breach?
Foresight for breach must be assessed according to a subjective
standard, at least at first, because episodic foresight depends on perception,
episodic memories, knowledge, evaluations, and predictions that are unique
to the actor.251 While the neural correlates of these mental states are
increasingly being identified, their inputs and outputs will depend on both the
situation and on that particular defendant. Foresight is guided by our
idiosyncratic values and priorities, which cannot be quantified and labeled
either “reasonable” or “unreasonable.”
Thus, foresight cannot possibly be standardized and converted into an
objective norm of “reasonable foreseeability.”252If we must analyze whether
it was reasonably foreseeable that someone would fall and be injured on a
defendant’s stairs, we must know more tokenized information about whether
this homeowner lived on rural land, never had guests, tried to repair the stairs,

249
Adam Bulley, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf, Prospection and the Present
Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed
Rewards, 20 Rev. of General Psychol. 29, 38 (2016)
250
Sean Laurent, Narina Nunez, and Kimberly Schweitzer, The Influence of Desire and
Knowledge on Perception of Each Other and Related Mental States and Different Mechanisms for
Blame, 60 J. Exp. Social Psych. 27, 28 (2015)
251
Thomas Suddendorf and Jonathan Redshaw, The development of mental scenario building
and episodic foresight, 1296 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135, 136 (2013)
252
Donna Rose Addis, Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation,
11 REV. OF PHIL AND PSYCHOL. 233, 235 (2020).”
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provided a warning, or whether the broken stairs were obvious even to kids.
Once you add those factual layers into the mix and any others that are
necessary, it stops being a purely objective analysis of breach. The law in
practice is really a confusing objective-subjective hybrid, which is much
more subjective than the law on the books would suggest. This leads to
doctrinal disarray and a blurring of the roles of judge and jury. As the
“reasonable foreseeability” tests for duty, proximate cause, and breach
necessarily incorporate the particular facts of this case, they now all blur into
one another.
Even if we could provide jurors with what an “average” person in the
shoes of the defendant would have actually foreseen—something that is
currently impossible—this average paint a picture of someone who is pretty
poor at foreseeing the future. This is not intuitive, but it is true. Ex ante, we
are biased toward foreseeing positive outcomes. Ex post, we will find
someone to blame if the outcome is negative.
To be sure, the objective standard for breach is appealing. It will be
difficult to prove that the defendant could have foreseen an outcome, and they
will of course be motivated to lie. While the concerns of deception are
legitimate, they exist regardless of whether we instruct jurors on the objective
or a subjective standard for breach. The “preponderance of the evidence”
burden of proof also lessens concerns of needing to conclusively proof the
contents of the defendant’s mind. But what really is the final nail in the coffin
for the objective standard for breach is that 1) it is inconsistent with current
practice—as jurors and judges are already incorporating subjective mental
state information in their assessment of breach—perhaps because 2) it is
impossible to assess foresight without information about the defendant’s
mental states, and 3) it invites cognitive bias and over-attribution of foresight
and blame. When jurors are allowed to focus only on the question of whether
the injury should have been prevented with foresight, they will skip right over
the critical inquiry of whether foresight was even possible. In the next section,
I will explain two well-documented cognitive biases that make this likely.
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR FORESEEABILITY INVITES BIASES
THAT INFLATE RATINGS OF BLAME
1. Assessing foreseeability requires reading the defendant’s mind
If factfinders are not instructed on the necessary components of
foreseeability, they will use their gut intuitions that are prone to bias. These
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biases are likely only exaggerated when jurors are instructed on an objective
test for foreseeability, which is immediately and exclusively normative.253
This presents a problem. These powerful and well-documented biases cannot
be corrected if their underlying trigger is presumed not to occur.
2. The Objective Standard for Foreseeability Invites The Curse of
Knowledge Hindsight Bias
Imagine a woman running through an urban neighborhood on a crisp
fall morning. She was paying close attention to the people around her, and
was also enjoying the beautiful foliage. She didn’t notice a small uneven
portion of the sidewalk under her feet. She tripped, and knocked over an older
woman walking in front of her. The older woman sued her for negligence,
arguing that she should have noticed the uneven sidewalk.
Even though the jury is instructed to evaluate whether the harm was
reasonably foreseeable ex ante, it is very hard for the jury not to rely on
knowledge of what actually occurred. This is made more likely as the jury
hears details about how the plaintiff’s injuries were caused, and can view
photographs of the scene. These reconstructions freeze the clock and allow
juries ample time to evaluate the landscape—superimposing their nearperfect ex post perception and awareness on to what they assume the
defendant could have and should have also foreseen. But of course, in the
moment, the actor had no such benefit.
The ability to retrospectively generate counterfactuals tells us little
about what the actor reasonably could have perceived or attended to in the
moment. And yet, counterfactuals, informed with perfect hindsight, are
frequently relied upon to say the defendant breached.254 This type of
hindsight bias, where we assume other people should have known what we

253
Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS
190-193 (2003); Alan Leslie, Joshua Knobe, and Adam Cohen, Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect
Effect: Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 421, (2006); Kevin Uttich,
& Tania Lombrozo, Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect
effect, 116 Cognition, 87–100 (2010); Kevin Uttich, & Tania Lombrozo, Norms inform mental state
ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect, 116 Cognition, 87, 91 (2010)
254
Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1368–70 (2016)
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now know, is called the “curse of knowledge.”255 The curse of knowledge
limits our ability to accurately read minds, as we assume others knew then
what we now know.
Multiple studies have demonstrated this phenomenon, which is linked
with overattributing knowledge, perception, awareness, and foresight.
Because this bias increases perceived foreseeability, it leads to inflating
findings of duty, breach, or proximate cause. Whichever element it operates
through, the curse of knowledge biases judgments by making defendants
appear more blameworthy and negligent than they are.256
With sophisticated enough tasks, the curse of knowledge can be found
in anyone.257 However, it only works one way—that is, we only
“overestimate how likely other people are to share [our] knowledge and do
not overestimate how likely other people are to share [our] ignorance.”258
This effect is stronger when adults have a rationale, even an implicit one, for
imputing knowledge or foreseeability. In a negligence case, this rationale
might be simply a desire to make someone pay for an older lady’s injuries.
The curse is exaggerated in children and people with autism who have a
harder time with theory of mind.259 The bias follows a u-shaped pattern across
the lifespan; preschool children and older adults exhibit more of a curse than
older children and younger adults.260

255
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge
on judgment under uncertainty
1 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE, 288,
288 (1975), (The receipt of outcome knowledge was found to increase the postdicted likelihood of
reported events and change the perceived relevance of event-descriptive data, regardless of the
likelihood of the outcome and the truth of the report.) See also, Siba E. Ghrear, Susan Birch, and Daniel
Bernstein, Outcome Knowledge and False Belief, 7 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 118, at p. 1 (2016)
256
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 572 (1998)
257
“[E]ven adults, who undoubtedly have a conceptual understanding of false beliefs, can
experience difficulty in predicting the consequences of another’s false beliefs when they have specific
outcome knowledge.” See, Siba E. Ghrear, Susan Birch, and Daniel Bernstein, Outcome Knowledge
and False Belief, 7 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 118, at p. 4 (2016)
258
Siba E. Ghrear, Susan Birch, and Daniel Bernstein, Outcome Knowledge and False Belief,
7 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 118, at p. 3 (2016)
259
Susan Birch and Paul Bloom, The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs,
18 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 382, 385 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.x
260
Siba E. Ghrear, Susan Birch, and Daniel Bernstein, Outcome Knowledge and False Belief,
7 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 118, at p. 3 (2016)
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Interestingly, we do not need to be certain about what occurred for
the curse to be triggered. The bias can exist when we are conjecturing about
likely causes, such as after hearing conflicting witness testimony in a
negligence trial.261 Many of us, after hearing that an accident occurred, will
mistakenly believe that we had “predicted it all along,” and thus the defendant
should have too.262
This bias has two apparent causes. First, we fail to inhibit the
knowledge we possess. Second, because we can easily recall the injury that
befell the plaintiff when the runner tripped, this ease makes us assume this
chain of events would be obvious to anyone, ex ante, and inevitable.263 This
is called “fluency misattribution.” It likely has direct impacts on negligence
trials, as jurors will confuse their subjective fluency with objective
foreseeability. 264
In legal contexts, studies of mock jurors and judges have
demonstrated the curse of knowledge in negligence cases.265 Recall that
foresight is a prospective judgment, so information about the particular
outcome should not be used to determine whether the harm was reasonably
foreseeable ex ante. However, when researchers vary how bad an outcome is,

261
Ina von der Beck, Ulrich Cress, & Aileen Oeberst, Is there hindsight bias without real
hindsight? Conjectures are sufficient to elicit hindsight bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 25(1), 88–99 (2019).
262
Ina von der Beck, Ulrich Cress, & Aileen Oeberst, Is there hindsight bias without real
hindsight? Conjectures are sufficient to elicit hindsight bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 25(1), 88–99 (2019).
263
Susan Birch, et al., A ‘curse of knowledge’ in the absence of knowledge? People
misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers, 166 COGNITION 447,
448-449 (2017)
264
Susan Birch, et al., A ‘curse of knowledge’ in the absence of knowledge? People
misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers, 166 COGNITION 447,
447 (2017
Susan Birch and Paul Bloom, The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs, 18
PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 382, 385 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.x
265
See, Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in
Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 271, 273 (2016) Markus Kneer, Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the outcomesensitive folk concept of reasonable (March 8, 2021) (forthcoming in Bystranowski, P., Janik, B. &
Prochnicki, M., JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: INTEGRATING EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES. Springer Nature. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3800110
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participants increase their ratings of the perceived foreseeability of harm in
relation to the severity of the outcome.266
The studies work this way: mock jurors are divided into two groups.
The breach is described identically in both groups, but in one group the
defendant is described as causing minor harm and in the other group he
caused a much more severe version of the same type of harm. When the harm
is severe and negative, mock jurors rate the defendant’s conduct as
significantly more careless and the harm as significantly more probable ex
ante.267 This effect has also been found in judges. In one study, the team found
“twice as many judges in the hindsight condition who affirmed negligence
(30%) compared with those in the foresight condition (14%).”268 Because the
only factor that is varied is the outcome, and the breach in each case was the
same, this presents a problem of moral and legal luck.269
In the case of the unlucky defendant who happens to cause significant
harm, people rate the outcome as objectively more foreseeable.270 One team
found that objective foreseeability was a “close-to-complete mediator”
between the severity of the outcome and assessments of negligence.271
Participants were much more likely to say the defendant “should have
believed” that the outcome was “probably” going to occur when the

266
Markus Kneer and Izabela Skoczen Outcome Effects, Moral Luck and the Hindsight Bias
[online]; Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in Injustice:
Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 271,
276 (2016)
267
“In retrospect, the probability of an accident is perceived as higher in the unlucky case,
the unlucky agent is judged as more negligent than the lucky one, and the unlucky agent—who is
perceived as more negligent—is judged more harshly.” See, Markus Kneer and Edouard Machery, No
Luck for Moral Luck, 182 COGNITION 331, 332 (2019)
268
Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in
Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 271, 273 (2016)
269
This bias seems to disappear when the participants are provided with both possibilities—
the case of severe harm and the case of minor harm and are allowed to compare the actions and
outcomes of each, side-by-side. However, negligent cases do not present in this way, where the
outcome can be realistically varied as the behavior remains constant. Thus, negligence cases are
inherently “between subjects” in design. See, Markus Kneer and Edouard Machery, NO LUCK FOR
MORAL LUCK, 182 Cognition 331, 335 (2019). I am currently studying this phenomenon in “duty to
warn” cases with Markus Kneer and Jan Garcia-Olier at the University of Zurich.
270
Markus Kneer and Izabela Skoczen Outcome Effects, Moral Luck and the Hindsight Bias
[online]
271
Markus Kneer and Edouard Machery, No Luck for Moral Luck, 182 COGNITION 331, 337
(2019)
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defendant was unlucky and the outcome was bad.272 This is not how
foreseeability calculations are supposed to work.
People rely on the curse of knowledge most when events are
unforeseeable and surprising.273 This is counterintuitive, and has enormous
significance for negligence liability. If an outcome is “truly expected in
foresight, there is no need to search for an explanation post hoc.”274
Psychologically, we focus on outlier events because we want to prevent them
from occurring again, and thus need to find someone to blame.275 Ironically,
then, in cases where the outcome is least objectively foreseeable ex ante, we
are more likely to employ the curse of knowledge to explain why it should
have been anticipated all along.276 This is quite concerning, and something of
which more judges and jurors should be aware.
There is yet another way that foresight ascriptions are
counterintuitive. Specifically, when actors are described as intentionally
doing an action A, but at the same time they accidentally cause consequence
B, they were judged more harshly if they were described as careful than if
they were described as careless.277 The researchers hypothesized that people
may confuse carefulness with greater knowledge or foresight.278 These
findings would seem to have immediate implications for medical malpractice
cases. For example, when a surgeon wields his tools carefully and precisely,

272

I do not propose bifurcating the trial, as others have, though that is another
possibility for combatting these cognitive biases and could work in tandem with the revisions
I propose. Shielding factfinders to the magnitude of harm would likely reduce hindsight bias,
but they would need to hear something very general about the type of harm caused, (such as
physical injury or property damage) to know whether this type could be foreseeable ex ante.
273

Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in
Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 271, 272 (2016)
274
Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in
Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 271, 272 (2016)
275
Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event Results in
Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges' Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
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COGNITION
754,
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(2008)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009
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Francesco Marconi and Luca Surian, Judging accidental harm: Due care and
foreseeability of side effects, Current Psychol. (2021) 7
278
Francesco Marconi and Luca Surian, Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability
of side effects, Current Psychol. (2021) 7
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and intentionally excises a tumor, while also accidentally striking a blood
vessel or causing some other injury, this may be considered more
blameworthy than if the surgeon is not described as a sophisticated actor who
is moving with care and precision. I am currently conducting empirical
research on this phenomenon with one of the authors of this fascinating study.
While these studies lack strong ecological validity (e.g., they are not
simulating real trials with cross-examination), there is reason to believe the
effects will be even stronger in actual cases. Researchers can provide
objective facts as “true” that would make mental state inferences either
correct or incorrect. And if they do not spoon-feed mental state information
to the participants, they are using between-subjects designs where the degree
of inflated foreseeability can be measured, and attributed to isolated
differences between conditions. In our ordinary lives, we infer mental states
based on facts that can be ambiguous, or even conflicting. Whether someone
intended an outcome is often open to multiple reasonable interpretations,
making it harder to detect bias, and easier to have plausible deniability in our
inflated foresight assessments. If we see these mental states inflated when
participants are explicitly told the actor is being careful, then we can only
imagine how strong the effects will be when jurors are presented with
ambiguous facts and a real-life, sympathetic plaintiff.
3. The Objective Standard for Foreseeability Invites Agency Bias
Humans have evolved to avoid explaining bad outcomes in terms of
freak accidents, caused by bad luck.279 Despite the crude bumper sticker that
says “Sh** happens,” we generally are reluctant to take this view. 280 Instead,
we find reasons for accidents that comfort us, and that attribute the bad
outcome to a person’s exercise of free will or agency.281 By pointing the
finger at someone’s carelessness, we can tell ourselves that this bad outcome
will not happen to us because we will be more careful, as will most other
people. When bad outcomes are attributed to a human, rather than some
random environmental event, they also seem easier to deter through

279
Albert Bandura, Toward a Psychology of Human Agency, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 164, 170 (2006)
280
Patrick Haggard, Sense of agency in the human brain 18 Nature Rev. Neurosci. 197, 197
(2017) https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2017.14
281
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punishment and incentives.282 This tendency, which I called the “agency
bias” leads us to inflate carelessness of both victims and transgressors, which
can elicit victim-blaming as well as finding breach when it is not present.283
We could be depressed and paralyzed into inaction if we did not feel
like we had control over the environment around us, which in psychology is
termed “self-efficacy.” In cultures like the United States, possessing selfefficacy, and free will, is considered extremely important.284 However, the
flipside of self-efficacy is personal responsibility.
Seeing people as autonomous agents who are answerable for the
consequences of their actions has “hidden, unanticipated, and potentially
negative interpersonal and collective consequences.”285 One such
consequence is that it leads us to blame individuals for life outcomes over
which they exert very little control.286 The agency bias makes us view actors
as careless for failing to foresee a harm that might have been very difficult to
foresee ex ante, and which might have been primarily caused by an
unpredictable and involuntary error.
Jurors likely engage the agency bias when assessing negligence cases.
They can do so by focusing on evidence that “supports an explanation of a
harmful event in terms of human agency… at the expense of purely physical
explanations that mitigate blame.”287 This phenomenon helps to explain how
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few negligence cases are resolved with a finding of “no breach.” We can
almost always find a human to blame.
Attributions of agency are “readily biased” both in our assessments
of our own conduct and in the assessment of the conduct of others.288 Despite
evidence that our “actions are triggered by environmental influences and
premotor processes that operate largely outside of consciousness” the brain
tricks us into generating a sense of agency through hindsight bias.289 Thus,
even when we consider our own actions, we often incorrectly assume afterthe-fact that we intended the consequences.290 The leading neuroscientist in
this area thus concluded that “the human sense of agency is not a
transcendental feature of human nature” but instead often results “from post
hoc inferences” that are “prone to illusion.”291 When you take our general
need to validate the blame we experience after bad outcomes, sprinkle in the
curse of knowledge and add our agency bias, and then ask lay people to focus
on whether this harm should have been prevented, as opposed to whether it
could have, it is no wonder we see so few cases resolved by findings of “no
breach.”
CONCLUSION
Because we fail to appreciate how foresight requires mindreading, we
fail to appreciate that it cannot be assessed in the abstract. It must be assessed
with reference to the defendant’s idiosyncratic values, priorities, memories,
knowledge, and perception. This is not just about what is fair, or moral. This
is about what is descriptively possible. There is no predicting the future
without some knowledge of the particular defendant’s past. Data also reveal
that, on average, we are all pretty lousy at foresight, though we think we are
much better than we are. With prospection, we have a bias toward seeing
outcomes as more positive, and in retrospect, when outcomes are negative,
we are keen to find someone to blame. There is nothing objectively
reasonable or rational about this. When you put together the idiosyncratic
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inputs to foresight and the fact that it is, on average, readily biased, the very
idea of “reasonable foreseeability” makes no sense.
In light of this, I propose revisions to the formulation for the elements
of negligence. My proposal tracks the existing elements and continues to hold
defendants to a standard of reasonable care, but with the judge deciding this,
as opposed to the jury. This better separates the role of judge and jury, and
focuses the jury’s attention on a descriptive test of foresight, with the judge
making the normative call. My proposal makes it clear how jurors are to
subjectivize the standard for breach and foresight. Under current doctrine, it
is not clear how much jurors are allowed to consider the defendant’s
particular situation under proximate cause and breach, and how much judges
are allowed to consider the same under duty. Allowing jurors to focus on the
subjective mental states of the defendant given the particular facts of the case
recognizes that foresight cannot be collapsed onto an objectively reasonable
standard and assessed in the abstract.
The elements of negligence would be:
1. The jury would decide whether the defendant probably could have
foreseen and could have prevented a legally recognized harm with a
specified type of greater care.
This would collapse factual, “but-for” causation and breach into a
single test, rather than having them both confusingly ask about foreseeability
of harm. It could reduce some of the inflation of foreseeability by focusing
the jury’s attention on finding facts rather than validating blame. Their
inquiry would be one of “could the defendant have done otherwise” and
“could this have probably prevented the harm” rather than “should he have.”
2. The judge would then decide whether defendants like this defendant
should be required to take more care in these situations, assuming that
they could.
This inquiry would look to policy factors such as the benefits and
burdens of imposing this obligation, but would keep the role of judge and
jury distinct. It would focus the judge on the policy factors that can be decided
in the abstract. Of course, judges are humans and engage in hindsight bias
too. But this division of labor will help the judge and jury separate out the
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could from the should, so that the two are not blurred together in the analysis
of duty, breach, and causation.
When we ignore the role of mindreading, it does not simply go away.
It will continue to occur in the shadows of the law, without any judicial
regulation or guidance. At present, jurors are told that breach can be assessed
by looking at conduct alone, while simultaneously being given a test for duty,
breach and causation that requires them to read the defendant’s mind.292 The
result is a confusing doublespeak. The doublespeak invites jurors to engage
in rudderless blame validation through the use of well-documented cognitive
biases that inflate ratings of foresight.
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